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Legalization of Assisted Suicide and Euthanasia:
Foundational Issues and Implications
Sean Murphy*
A BSTRACT

This paper takes a general approach by examining foundational
issues, and the primary focus is on a single jurisdiction: Canada. It
outlines the current legal criteria for euthanasia and assisted suicide
in Canada, identifying differences in criteria for the procedures set by
the Supreme Court of Canada, Quebec’s unique provincial euthanasia law, and the Criminal Code.
Commentary drawing from anecdotal reports from eight dissenting physicians offers some insight into their experience since legalization of the procedures. Material from the public record provides additional context, and the commentary is informed by difficulties that
have arisen in relation to morally contested procedures. The experience of dissenting physicians is affected by a number of variables, including cultural and social dynamics, differing beliefs, differing moral
and social sensitivity and individual personalities. Four sources of
stress are identified: the demand for collaboration in killing, the prospect of punishment, the continuing need to distinguish between cooperation and collaboration, and concern for their patients. Particular concerns of palliative care physicians are discussed, as well as
concerns shared by other dissenting physicians.
A detailed review of the moral underpinnings of the trial court
decision in Carter v. Canada demonstrates that morality precedes and
drives law. From this it is argued that a judge will either assume or
construct a moral justification that supports a decision, even if this is
not explicitly articulated in legal reasoning. These assertions are tested against the ruling of the Irish High Court in Fleming v. Ireland &
* Sean Murphy has been the Administrator of the Protection of Conscience Project since its
inception in 1999, responsible for its day-to-day management and operations. The Project is a
non-profit, non-denominational initiative with international interests that advocates for freedom of conscience among health care workers. It does not take a position on the morality of
contentious procedures, but critiques policies of coercion, encourages accommodation and
promotes clarification and understanding of the issues involved to assist in reasoned public discussion.
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Ors, which came to radically different conclusions about the risks
presented by legalization of assisted suicide and euthanasia.
An extensive discussion distinguishes the obligation to kill from
the more familiar authorization or justification of killing. An obligation to kill can be based upon a contract model of obligation, a social
contract (professional) model, and a fiduciary model, each with increasingly serious consequences. To allow the state to enforce an obligation to kill under any of the three models is subversive of life, liberty and security of the person, even before issues of freedom of
conscience and religion are considered. In addition, the implications
of an obligation to kill suggest that, in the long term, assisted-suicideonly regimes are likely to be unstable.
Legislative developments demonstrate that the government of
Canada supports totalitarian claims seeking total domination of will
and intellect in moral decision-making, even in matters of life and
death. The ground for this was prepared by demands that dissenting
physicians should be forced to refer for abortion and contraception,
which established popular support for the erroneous and incoherent
principle that there can be a moral duty to do what one believes to be
wrong.
The Carter ruling formally ratified a new establishment orthodoxy, according to which refusing to at least collaborate in killing in
circumstances defined by Carter is unacceptable. This new orthodoxy
can be expected to operate at a foundational level, exerting a significant influence that may not be immediately obvious. A defense of
freedom of conscience and religion must take this into account.
In particular, the medico-legal establishment sees the exercise of
freedom of conscience and religion through the dogmatic lens of the
new orthodoxy. Dissenting physicians are viewed as heretics threatening an establishment theory of social contract. This is dogmatic
moral imperialism, and not less so because the dogmatists are not ecclesiastical theorists and functionaries. It should be identified as such.
Again, foundational moral beliefs shape jurisprudence. Judges
should be challenged to candidly acknowledge and precisely articulate the philosophical or moral premises underpinning their positions. Similarly, what lies at the root of current controversies about
freedom of conscience and religion is fundamental disagreement
about the nature of the human person. Thus, judges should clearly
acknowledge the credal concept of the human person that informs
the evaluation of evidence and legal reasoning.
334

MURPHY.MACRO.4.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

333]

5/31/2017 5:39 PM

Legalization of Assisted Suicide and Euthanasia

Finally, freedom of conscience is exercised in two different ways.
The first is by pursuing some good that one thinks should be done;
call this perfective freedom of conscience, because the pursuit of the
good as one understands it is thought to be perfective of the human
person. The second is refusing to do what one believes to be wrong;
call this preservative freedom of conscience, or preservative of personal integrity.
No polity could long exist without restrictions of some sort on
human acts, so some limitation of perfective freedom of conscience is
not unexpected. On the other hand, suppressing preservative freedom
of conscience by compelling people to serve ends they find morally
abhorrent reduces them to a form of servitude that cannot be reconciled with principles of equality. It is inconsistent with the best traditions and aspirations of liberal democracy, since it instils attitudes
more suited to totalitarian regimes than to the demands of responsible freedom. It arguably imposes upon them a particularly odious
form of involuntary servitude, which is all but forbidden by the Thirteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States.
This does not mean that no restriction can ever be placed on preservative freedom of conscience. It does mean, however, that if the
restriction can be justified at all, it will only be as a last resort and only in the most exceptional circumstances.
I. I NTRODUCTION
This paper reflects upon some of the implications of the legalization of assisted suicide and euthanasia. Consistent with the Project’s
mandate, this paper’s focus is on physicians who object to the procedures for reasons of conscience or religion, and on the broader implications for law and fundamental freedoms. While legalization of the
procedures also affects nurses and other health care workers, it is appropriate to begin with physicians because it is legalization of physician-assisted suicide and physician-administered euthanasia that is
most frequently advocated.
The physicians who are the focus of this paper are referred to
throughout as dissenters rather than objectors. Certainly, they have
religious or conscientious objections to euthanasia and assisted suicide, but, generally speaking that is because they dissent from a new
orthodoxy espoused by establishment high priests who have a considerable following.
335
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A. Problems of the Approach
In considering the implications of the legalization of assisted suicide and euthanasia, this paper takes a general approach by examining
foundational issues, and the primary focus is on a single jurisdiction.
This mitigates some of the factors affecting the validity of empirical
research and systematic comparisons across jurisdictions: methodology, the nature and scope of legalization, jurisprudential traditions,
and cultural and social differences. However, these difficulties are
acknowledged here because they cannot be entirely avoided.

1. Methodology
The implications of the legalization of assisted suicide and euthanasia might be revealed by studying what has happened in jurisdictions where it has been legalized. In theory, legalization should produce measurable results that can be studied over time to provide
empirical findings about changes attributable to it. It will be seen,
however, that people—including judges—can cite the same data to
justify diametrically opposite conclusions.
Further, important data may be lacking for the period prior to legalization so that it may be extremely difficult—even impossible—to
empirically establish the existence, nature and extent of a change. For
example, the Canadian Medical Association conducted surveys of
physician attitudes about euthanasia and assisted suicide prior to, and
soon after, the Supreme Court of Canada decision that approved the
practices. However, these were of doubtful empirical value so that,
even if scientific surveys are done in the future, comparisons are unlikely to yield findings of significant value. In addition, commentators
like Professor Margaret Somerville argue that some important kinds
of changes are not easily measured.
“The problem,” she says, “is that many of the serious risks and
harms of legalized physician-assisted suicide and euthanasia, at levels
other than that of the individual, are not physical risks and harms but
metaphysical ones (to values, beliefs, attitudes, norms and so on) that
are not necessarily assessable through empirical research, especially
the metaphysical harms that will occur in the future.” 1

1. MARGARET SOMERVILLE, BIRD ON AN ETHICS WIRE: BATTLES ABOUT VALUES
IN THE CULTURE WARS 132 (Mc-Gill-Queen’s University Press 2015) [hereinafter Somerville,

Bird].
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This is related to another methodological problem: that the implications of legalization (whatever they might be) may not be evident
during the period of study. This is certainly the case in Canada,
where euthanasia and assisted suicide first became legally available
only within the last year.

2. Nature of legalization
Legalization is not a uniform process. It can be triggered by judicial fiat (Canada), through referendum or citizen initiative (Washington and Oregon), and by a public policy of non-prosecution, which
ultimately leads to legislation (Netherlands). Legalization can also
occur directly by legislative action (Quebec, California, and Vermont), but these proceedings may differ among jurisdictions with respect to public and professional input, balance, transparency, and
thoroughness. The implications of legalization will depend, in part,
upon the manner in which it is achieved.

3. Scope of legalization
Some jurisdictions distinguish between euthanasia and assisted
suicide, and allow both (Canada); some distinguish between them,
but allow only one or the other (Quebec allows only euthanasia;
American states allow only assisted suicide); some allow both (the
Netherlands). In addition, criteria for the procedures vary among jurisdictions and can change with time, and different jurisdictions have
different rules about who can provide the services, and different procedural requirements.

4. Jurisprudential considerations
Different constitutional traditions are likely to exert influence on
the understanding of law and the development of jurisprudence, particularly in relation to human rights, all having implications for consequences flowing from legalization of the procedures.

5. Cultural and social differences
Finally, legalization always occurs within a specific cultural and
social framework. Some jurisdictions are relatively homogenous in
ethnicity, religion, language, and customs, while others are notably
337
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diverse. Some jurisdictions are culturally and socially similar to each
other, while quite different from others. Implications for families and
society may vary considerably within a culturally and socially heterogeneous jurisdiction, as well as between jurisdictions.

II. E UTHANASIA AND A SSISTED S UICIDE IN C ANADA

A. Legal Background
Sue Rodriguez was 41 years old when diagnosed with amyotrophic lateral sclerosis (ALS or Lou Gehrig’s Disease) in 1991. She
wanted a physician to assist her to commit suicide, but assisted suicide was illegal. She launched a constitutional challenge that was
heard by the Supreme Court of Canada in 1993. By a 5-4 decision
the Court ruled that the law prohibiting assisted suicide did not violate the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms. 2
Seeking to reverse the Rodriguez decision, in 2011 the British
Columbia Civil Liberties Association and others filed what became
the landmark case of Carter v. Canada (Attorney General). The
plaintiffs specifically wanted physician assisted suicide and physician
administered euthanasia because, they claimed, these were medical
treatments. Medical treatments, they argued, fell under provincial
health care jurisdiction and could not be prohibited by the federal
government in the Criminal Code. They sought euthanasia and assisted suicide for any grievously and irremediably ill patient, not just
for the terminally ill. 3
In 2014, ten days after a British Columbia Supreme Court judge
had ruled in favour of the plaintiffs in Carter, 4 the Quebec government passed the Act Respecting End of Life Care (ARELC), declaring that eligible patients have a right to “end-of life-care” including
euthanasia. It authorized euthanasia by physicians, but not assisted
suicide. 5
Euthanasia under the terms of the Quebec law amounted to firstdegree murder under Canada’s Criminal Code, a federal statute, but
2. Rodriguez v. B.C., [1993] 3 S.C.R. 519 (Can.).
3. In the Supreme Court of British Columbia Notice of Civil Claim, B.C. CIVIL
LIBERTIES ASS’N (Apr. 26, 2011), https://bccla.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/03/20110426BCCL A-Legal-Case-Carter-et-al.pdf.
4. Carter v. Canada, [2012] BCSC 886 (Can.).
5. An Act Respecting End-of-Life Care, S.C. 2013, c. 52 (Can.) (Original text and text
as passed by the Quebec National Assembly, 5 June, 2014) [hereinafter ARELC].
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Canadian provinces have constitutional jurisdiction to administer the
criminal law. Quebec’s attorney general promised immunity from
prosecution for physicians who complied with ARELC. The federal
government did not intervene. While traditional political concerns
about Quebec nationalism were likely a factor, the Quebec law did
not take effect until December 2015. This was long after the pending
ruling by the Supreme Court of Canada in Carter, and also after the
federal election. It made legal and political sense to take no action at
least until after the ruling.
On February 6th, 2015, the nine Supreme Court justices unanimously ruled in Carter that physicians should be allowed to provide
euthanasia or assisted suicide in some circumstances. 6 They suspended the ruling for a year to give governments and the medical profession a chance to enact new laws and regulations. The Court later
granted a four-month extension of the suspension. However, it also
allowed euthanasia to proceed during that time in Quebec, under its
provincial statute, and authorized superior courts elsewhere to grant
euthanasia or assisted suicide requests in accordance with the Carter
ruling. 7 In June 2016, Parliament passed an amendment to the Criminal Code to implement the Carter decision.

B. Criteria for Euthanasia/Assisted Suicide
It might be said that Canada actually has three sources of laws
governing euthanasia and assisted suicide: the Supreme Court ruling
in Carter, the Quebec euthanasia law, and the Criminal Code. The
only thing that everyone agrees upon is that the Carter ruling is the
standard that other laws have to meet. The following summary is
limited to an outline of the basic criteria established by each.

1. Carter
The Carter ruling requires that physicians be allowed to provide
euthanasia or assisted suicide:
• for competent adults who clearly consent,
• who have a grievous and irremediable medical condition,
• including illness, disease, or disability,
6. Carter v. Canada, [2015] S.C.R 331 (Can.).
7. Carter v. Canada, [2016] S.C.R 13 (Can.).
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•

that causes enduring and intolerable physical or psychological suffering,
• that cannot be relieved by means acceptable to the individual.
The Court did not rule out allowing euthanasia or assisted suicide
in other situations. That is yet to be decided by Parliament or by further litigation. 8

2. Quebec
The Quebec law is more restrictive than Carter because it allows
only euthanasia, and only for someone “at the end of life” 9 who is in
an “advanced state of irreversible decline in capability.” 10 Otherwise,
it is essentially the same as Carter.

3. Criminal Code
The Criminal Code is more permissive than Carter in one respect. It allows both physicians and nurse practitioners to provide the
end of life services. 11
It is more specific than Carter because it requires that candidates
be at least 18 years old. This is consistent with Carter’s requirement
that the candidates be adults.
Candidates must also be eligible for government health insurance, a provision intended to prevent suicide tourism. The Court was
silent on this issue.
However, the Criminal Code adds three criteria not found in
Carter.
First: the illness, disease or disability must be incurable.
Second: the candidate must be in an advanced state of irreversible decline in capability, a provision borrowed from the
Quebec law.
Third: the natural death of the candidate must be reasonably
foreseeable, though no timeline is required. This is similar to
the Quebec law. 12
8. See Carter, [2015] S.C.R. 331 at ¶ 127.
9. ARELC, supra note 5, § 26(3).
10. ARELC, supra note 5, § 26(5).
11. The Criminal Code authorizes nurse practitioners to provide euthanasia and assisted
suicide, but they can do so only if permitted by provincial regulations or policies.
12. An Act to amend the Criminal Code and to make related amendments to other Acts
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The B.C. Civil Liberties Association has filed a lawsuit alleging
that these provisions are unconstitutional. 13

C. The Current Situation
While the federal government has jurisdiction in criminal law,
provinces have jurisdiction in health care and the regulation of health
care professions. Quebec law allows physicians to provide only euthanasia; elsewhere, subject to provincial regulations, physicians and
nurse practitioners may provide either assisted suicide or euthanasia.
Religiously affiliated hospitals are incorporated into the state health
care system on terms which seem to have largely respected their denominational integrity. Now they face increasingly strident demands
that they be forced to provide the procedures. 14
Provincial medical regulators are called Colleges of Physicians
and Surgeons. The College of Physicians and Surgeons in Ontario
demands effective referral by dissenting physicians for all morally
contested procedures, including euthanasia and assisted suicide.15
An effective referral means a referral made in good faith, to a nonobjecting, available, and accessible physician, other health-care professional, or agency. The referral must be made in a timely manner
to allow patients to access care. Patients must not be exposed to adverse clinical outcomes due to a delayed referral. 16

Two lawsuits have been filed against the Ontario College as a result. 17 The College in Nova Scotia makes a similar demand under the
(medical assistance in dying), S.C. 2016, C-14 (Can.).
13. See Julia Lamb & B.C. Civil Liberties Ass’n, In The Supreme Court of British Columbia Notice of Civil Claim, B.C. CIVIL LIBERTIES ASS’N (June 27, 2016),
https://bccla.org/wp-content/ uploads/2016/06/2016-06-27-Notice-of-Civi l-Claim-1.pdf.
14. See Paula Simons, If Covenant Health won’t obey law, it shouldn’t get public funds
to run public hospitals, EDMONTON J. (Feb. 12, 2016), http://edmontonjournal.com/opinion
/columnists/paula-simons-if-covenant-health-wont-obey-law-it-shouldnt-get-public-funds-to-r
un-public-hospitals [hereinafter Simons].
15. Policy Statement #4-16, Medical Assistance in Dying, COLL. OF PHYSICIANS AND
SURGEONS OF ONTARIO (June 2016) http://www.cpso.on.ca/Policies-Publications/Policy/
Medical-Assistance-in-Dying [hereinafter CPSO-MAID].
16. Policy Statement #2-15, Professional Obligations and Human Rights, COLL. OF
PHYSICIANS AND SURGEONS OF ONTARIO, (March 2015) http://www.cpso.on.ca/policie
s-publications/policy/professional-obligations-and-human-rights [hereinafter CPSO-POHR].
17. See Christian Medical and Dental Society of Canada et al., Ontario Superior Court
of Justice Notice of Application, THE PROTECTION OF CONSCIENCE PROJECT (Mar. 20,
2015), http://consciencelaws.org/archive/documents/cpso/2015-03-20-cmds-notice.pdf; see
also Coalition for HealthCARE and Conscience, Ontario physicians oppose referrals for assisted suicide, seek judicial review of CPSO requirement, THE PROTECTION OF CONSCIENCE
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rubric of an effective transfer of care. 18 The Code of Ethics of the
Collège des Médecins du Québec requires dissenting physicians to
refer for services they decline to provide. 19 The Quebec euthanasia
law alludes to this 20 but also allows a physician who refuses to provide
euthanasia for reasons of conscience to notify a designated administrator, who then becomes responsible for finding a willing practitioner. 21

D. Drawing the Line Between Co-operation and Collaboration
Other regulators have adopted the following approach for all
morally contested services, including euthanasia and assisted suicide: 22
• Dissenting physicians are expected to provide information needed for informed medical decision
making, such as prognosis, treatments or procedures available, benefits and burdens of treatment,
etc. A physician unwilling to provide this kind of
information is required to refer the patient to
someone who will. This referral is for information, not for the morally contested service.
• If need be, dissenting physicians are expected to
advise patients how they can find other physicians
or health care providers.
• While most policies do not say so explicitly, dissenting physicians are not expected to make an effective referral for a morally contested service.
This is generally accepted by dissenting physicians. They are
willing to cooperate to enable a patient to make informed decisions
PROJECT (June 20, 2016), http://consciencelaws.org/blog/?p=6913.
18. Professional Standard Regarding Medical Assistance in Dying, C. OF PHYSICIANS &
SURGEONS OF NOVA SCOTIA (June 22, 2016), http://www.cpsns.ns.ca/DesktopModules
/Bring2mind/DMX/Download.aspx?PortalId=0&TabId=129&EntryId=284.
19. Code of Ethics of Physicians, R.S.Q., c C-26 (Can.) (the section does not explicitly
require effective referral, but the official gloss provided by the College makes clear that is intended); Legal, Ethical and Organizational Aspects of Medical Practice in Quebec, Personal
Convictions: Conscientious Objection, ALDO-QUEBEC, http://aldo.cmq.org/en/Grands
Themes/ConvictionsPerso/ObjectConsc.aspx (last visited Nov. 2, 2016).
20. ARELC § 50.
21. Id. at § 31.
22. See Policy and Position Statements, PROTECTION OF CONSCIENCE PROJECT,
http://consciencelaws .org/background/policy001.aspx#REGULATORS (last visited Apr. 8,
2017).
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and find other physicians, but they refuse to collaborate in what they
consider to be wrongdoing.

III. E XPERIENCE OF D ISSENTING P HYSICIANS
Anecdotal reports from eight dissenting Canadian physicians
provide some insight into the experience of physicians who object to
participation in homicide and suicide since the new laws came into
effect. While obviously limited, the reports are instructive, particularly when combined with information from public sources and informed by the experience of dissenting physicians concerning other
morally contested procedures. This section of the paper was returned
to the contributing physicians for comment to ensure accuracy and
protection of their privacy. Responses were positive; no revisions
were required.
A report from one dissenter suggests that implementing an assisted suicide and euthanasia regime can be managed without trampling
fundamental freedoms:
I have not heard of or experienced any marginalization or pressure
with regards to conscientious objection. In fact, there is almost
unanimous support for the protection of conscience rights from the
people I have met at work and through conversations with others
about their contexts. Even the most pro-euthanasia colleagues that I
have met are clear that they want to protect dissenters from becoming complicit in the act.
I would say that the efforts to remove protections for conscientious
dissenters do not represent the general thought of the majority of
health care providers. There are thousands of conscientious dissenters in the health care system in Canada and if they are not protected
there will be a massive exodus out of the health care system. Our
system is not capable of sustaining such a loss. 23

Unfortunately, this experience is far from universal, As this paper
was being prepared for publication, a committee of the Ontario legislature heard an oncologist describe what is happening at one of Toronto’s major hospitals:
At my institution, physicians are being bullied into accepting the
role of the most responsible physician for MAID patients. This
forces these physicians to be legally responsible for the MAID act,
23. Personal communication of Physician D and the author (Sept. 9, 2016) [hereinafter
Physician D].
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even when that goes against their conscience or religious beliefs. It
gets worse: At one of our staff meetings, a psychiatrist stood up and
announced that any physician who didn’t actively support MAID
should not be working at our hospital. . .
There’s a horrendous stress level at our hospital. Physicians are
afraid to speak up. Physicians are afraid that they will lose their jobs
if they say anything. Even just speaking to my colleagues about this,
we use alternative email addresses and we speak in code. We feel
sometimes like we’re in some sort of dystopian novel. 24

It will be seen from what follows that the experience of dissenting
physicians where assisted suicide or euthanasia is legal depends upon
a number of variables and is the product of stress from a number of
sources.

A. Variables
1. Scope of legalization and legal protection
First, the scope of legalization and the extent of protection afforded by conscience legislation is significant. Legal expectations in
an assisted suicide regime may be less challenging than in jurisdictions where only physician-administered euthanasia is allowed. Adequate protection of conscience measures may or may not exist, or
may vary in effectiveness.

2. Cultural and social dynamics
Second, while the law is important, its effects may be mitigated or
eclipsed by cultural and social dynamics. As one physician observed,
“The language of the law does not transpose directly into the practice
environment. In reality, patients and colleagues have a much greater
impact on the practice environment than the law.” 25

24. Committee Documents: Standing Committee on Finance and Economic Affairs 2017-Mar-23 - Bill 84, Medical Assistance in Dying Statute Law Amendment Act (Mar. 23,
2017), http://www.ontla.on.ca/web/committee-proceedings/committee_transcripts_details.do?
Date=2017-03-23&ParlCommID=8997&BillID=4460&Business=&locale=en&DocumentID=3
1834#P1025_246018.
25. Personal communication of Physician E and the author (Aug. 25, 2016) [hereinafter
Physician E].

344

MURPHY.MACRO.4.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

333]

5/31/2017 5:39 PM

Legalization of Assisted Suicide and Euthanasia

3. Differing beliefs
Third, dissenting physicians are motivated by different religious,
moral, or philosophical traditions. Even physicians of the same religious persuasion or who apply the same moral or ethical principles
may not reach the same conclusions when faced with conflicts of conscience.

4. Differing moral and social sensitivity
Fourth, people differ in moral and social sensitivity. Their experience of moral distress varies in intensity, as does their response to
it, and they are not equally attuned to the communication of approval
or disapproval by others. What causes acute distress in one person
may be overlooked by someone else.

5. Differing dispositions
Finally, people differ also in natural dispositions. When faced
with a moral challenge, their instinctive responses are likely to lie on
a continuum between fight and flight. In uncertain situations, when
no course of action recommends itself, stress is likely to build. This
will have a corrosive effect and may, in a crisis, generate explosive reactions.

A. Sources of Stress
While it is obvious that the legalization of assisted suicide and euthanasia is stressful for physicians who object to the procedures for
reasons of conscience, it is necessary to identify the actual sources of
stress to appreciate their situation. There appear to be four, all operating simultaneously.

1. The demand for collaboration in killing
No jurisdiction requires dissenting physicians to personally kill
patients or help them commit suicide—yet. Thus, the first source of
stress for dissenters is not a demand that they kill patients, but that
they arrange for a patient to be killed by somone else by making an
effective referral. 26 The demand itself, perceived as fundamentally
26. See Udo Schuklenk et al., The Royal Society of Canada Expert Panel: End-of-Life
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unjust and evil, generates moral indignation, even outrage. “The role
of physician as healer has been perverted, with expectations placed
upon us physicians that are diametrically opposed to the values and
motivations of why I entered into the practice of medicine.” 27
However, professional and social environments are decidedly
hostile to the expression of moral disapproval of euthanasia; a pretence of neutrality makes cool, detached, non-judgemental discourse
normative. Dissenters are often constrained to contain and redirect
their natural indignation, with varying degrees of difficulty and success, and this generates internal pressures.

2. The prospect of punishment
The second source of stress for dissenters is the ever-present prospect they will be punished or disadvantaged for refusing to collaborate in killing, even forced out of medical practice. This, too, may
provoke moral indignation. “[W]hen society makes it impossible for
me to continue, with expectations that cannot be ethically and practically met, I may need to stop practicing, not because I want to, but
because an intolerant society has demanded it to be so.” 28
More important, it causes ongoing uncertainty and insecurity,
naturally tending to the development of hypervigilance, defensive
strategies and worst-case scenario planning. Fear of retaliation or
harassment may explain why 55 of 804 physician signatories to the
Declaration of the Physicians Alliance Against Euthanasia did not
want their names published. 29 This concern has made it necessary, in
this paper, to redact material contributed by dissenting physicians to
ensure that they cannot be identified.

Decision Making, ROYAL SOC’Y OF CAN. 62, 69, 101 (Nov. 2011), http://rsc-src.ca
/sites/default/files/pdf/RSCEndofLifeReport2011_EN_Formatted_FINAL.pdf
[hereinafter
Royal Society]; see also Jocelyn Downie et al., Moving Forward with a Clear Conscience: A
Model Conscientious Objection Policy for Canadian Colleges of Physicians and Surgeons, 21
HEALTH L. REV 28 (2013) [hereinafter Downie et. al.]; see generally CPSO-MAID, supra note
15.
27. Personal communication of Physician A and the author (Aug. 9, 2016) [hereinafter
Physician A].
28. Id.
29. Founding Physicians and First Signatories of the Physicians Alliance Against Euthanasia Declaration, PHYSICIANS’ ALLIANCE AGAINST EUTHANASIA, http://collectifmedecins.
org/en/declaration/signatories/ (last visited Sept. 25, 2016).
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3. The need to distinguish between cooperation and collaboration
Facing the possibility of discipline and even the loss of livelihood,
dissenters struggle to find a balance that will satisfy Caesar so that
they can continue in practice without compromising their personal
integrity. Thus, the third stressor is the continuing need to distinguish between co-operation and collaboration: to discern when morally acceptable or excusable cooperation becomes unacceptable collaboration. This is particularly burdensome, since the distinction is
not always easily made, and the consequences are particularly grave.
Here, there is an additional and painful complication: dissenting
physicians who are unanimous in rejecting euthanasia and assisted suicide may differ among themselves on this most sensitive and difficult
point. This is evident in the different responses of dissenting physicians to Quebec’s legal requirement that they notify an administrator
(DPS) when they refuse to provide euthanasia for a patient, so that
the administrator can find someone willing to do so.
Acceptable: This is not a direct referral, nor is it an
effective referral. The DPS is mandated to know of all
significant conflicts between a physician and a patient,
and this is no exception. In fact, our particular DPS
has been very understanding of our position and has
offered support to physicians who are involved in
these cases. 30
Not acceptable: This form of collaboration in killing
a patient, with all due respect, is not the ultimate
compromise. It is an obligation to collaborate—which
can be experienced by a physician as complicity in an
act he considers to be harmful to his patient, irrelevant whether the act is criminal or not (the crime
evoked here only compounds the insult of the obligation). 31

4. Concern for their patients
Finally, convinced, as they are, that euthanasia and assisted suicide are grave and destructive evils, dissenters are perpetually bur30. Physician D, supra note 23.
31. Marc Beauchamp, Physicians: Quebec “solution” is collaboration in killing, not an
“elegant” compromise, THE PROTECTION OF CONSCIENCE PROJECT (Feb. 15, 2016),
http://consciencelaws.org/blog/?p=6456.
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dened with concern for their patients, for whose welfare they feel especially responsible. This can be thrown back in their faces as disrespectful paternalism, unwelcome moralizing, and unacceptable interference with patient autonomy.
Trying as this is, what is worse is the fear that failing to find the
right words, failing to hit the right note, or a mistake in judgement
might contribute to the killing of a patient. Here the ever-present
problem of distinguishing between cooperation and collaboration is
particularly acute.
There is a further point:
My first responsibility is to the patient, and what’s best for the patient. And what I’m realizing is, because of inadequate end-of-life
services, and there are cases that I could discuss, it might be the best
thing for a person to have euthanasia, because of the lack of palliative care services. And that realization makes me angry. 32

All of the preceding variables and stressors should be kept in mind
when considering the implications of legalizing assisted suicide or euthanasia for dissenting physicians.

A. Effects of Legalizing Assisted Suicide/Euthanasia on Dissenting
Physicians
Legalization is commonly preceded by extensive public debate,
whether generated by legislative hearings or court proceedings. If
earlier attempts at legalization have been unsuccessful—as they often
are—those opposed to euthanasia may be confident that the latest efforts will also fail. Dissenting physicians are likely to be shocked
when, contrary to their expectations, the law is changed. “I never believed it would come into effect. I was in big denial, things were relatively easy.” 33
When the law changes, more shocks may be in store. In 2005,
National Post journalist Charles Lewis found his editors doubtful
that attempts to legalize euthanasia/assisted suicide were newsworthy.
Ten years later, just after the Supreme Court of Canada ruled in
Carter, he said, “suddenly, everybody I know is in favour of euthanasia.” 34
32. Personal communication of Physician B and the author (Aug. 8, 2016) [hereinafter
Physician B].
33. Id.
34. Margaret Somerville & Charles Lewis, Where to now, Saint Peter?, CONVIVIUM
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Some dissenting physicians were just as surprised—and alarmed
and demoralized—to discover that opposition to euthanasia among
their colleagues dissolved with the change in the law, and the widespread resistance they had anticipated did not materialize. 35

1. Palliative care physicians
Legalization of assisted suicide and euthanasia has more serious
implications for some specialties than others, notably palliative care.
It has begun to affect the concept of accompaniment, which has been
central to the practice of palliative care from the beginning.
Accompaniment in the tradition of palliative care can be described as “a human solidarity pact,” in which physicians and caregivers “[accompany] patients through all the symptoms and stages of
their disease.” 36 In this sense, it has nothing to do with euthanasia or
assisted suicide, nor is it simply an expression of the ethical duty of
non-abandonment, which does not imply nearly as much.
However, the concept is being stretched, notably in Belgium,
where what is termed “the caring practice of ‘euthanasia accompaniment’ (euthanasiebegeleiding) is part of the daily work of palliative
care professionals” because the practice of euthanasia has become
embedded in palliative care. Refusal to participate in the patient’s
journey to euthanasia is now characterized by some Belgian palliative
care specialists—including a Jesuit priest—as abandonment, even if a
physician who withdraws refers a patient to a willing colleague outside the palliative network. 37 A prominent Belgian Catholic priesttheologian who has been providing such accompaniment for about
five years has just published a book on the subject.38
These developments are contentious outside of Belgium, the Palliative Care Federation of Flanders being described as either a heretic
or innovative outlier, depending on one’s point of view. 39 No doubt,
(Apr. 1, 2015), http://www.conviviummagazine.ca/article/4441/where-to-now-saint-peter.
35. Physician E, supra note 25.
36. Canadian Cancer Soc’y Pub. Issues Dep’t, Palliative Care. . . Caring for Life,
CANADIAN CANCER SOC’Y 3 (2014), available at https://www.cancer.ca/~/media/cancer.ca/
QC/get%20involved/take%20action/Advocacy/Palliative-care-2015.pdf.
37. Paul Berghe et. al., Assisted dying–the current situation in Flanders: euthanasia embedded in palliative care, 20 EUR. J. OF PALLIATIVE CARE 6, 266–72 (2013).
38. See GABRIEL RINGLET, VOUS ME COUCHEREZ NU SUR LA TERRE NUE:
L’ACCOMPAGNEMENT SPIRITUEL JUSQU’À L’EUTHANASIE (LIE ME DOWN NAKED ON THE
BARE EARTH: SPIRITUAL ACCOMPANIMENT TO EUTHANASIA) (Albin Michel 2015).
39. Jan L. Bernheim et. al., Questions and Answers on the Belgian Model of Integral

349

MURPHY.MACRO.4.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

BYU Journal of Public Law

5/31/2017 5:39 PM

[Vol. 31

one of the issues is that the rate of euthanasia and life-ending acts
without explicit request has been found to be higher in Belgian inpatient palliative care units than in hospitals or nursing homes, and
euthanasia is more likely after spiritual care has been provided than
when it has not. 40
In any case, some dissenting palliative care physicians are disturbed by the possibility that, in the longer term, a changed concept
of accompaniment will transform palliative care at its roots, making it
difficult for them to continue in practice. In the meantime, the introduction of euthanasia and assisted suicide has had more immediate
effects.
Then the law came into effect, and everything changed. It’s like a
very different situation, and I’m coming across this every day . . .
And it’s always a case-by-case situation. It’s always like that in palliative . . . but I realize now what the implications are, when it’s caseby-case where euthanasia is an option as prescribed by the law. 41
In palliative care in Quebec, one excellent palliative care physician
has compared her daily life under this law to living in a war zone.
You never know when a death request is going to land on you. You
can’t be giving hope to dying patients in one room and euthanizing
them in the next. Another doctor retired early the day the law came
into effect for this reason. 42
[W]e have noted that patients who want access to medical aid in dying become very resistant to the provision of Palliative Care. They
reject our multidisciplinary approach to whole-patient well-being,
opting instead for this “easy” way out. 43

2. Capacity assessments
Under the current law, patients must be competent (have legal
End-of-Life Care: Experiment? Prototype?: “Eu-Euthanasia”:The Close Historical, and Evidently Synergistic, Relationship Between Palliative Care and Euthanasia in Belgium: An Interview With a Doctor Involved in the Early Development of Both and Two of His Successors, J.
OF BIOETHICAL INQUIRY,

507, 514 (2014).
40. Lieve Van den Block et. al., Euthanasia and other end of life decisions and care provided in final three months of life: nationwide retrospective study in Belgium, b2772 BRIT.
MED. J. 339 (2009).
41. Physician B, supra note 31.
42. Standing Comm. on Justice and Human Rights, 42nd Parliament, 1st Sess., Meeting
No. 13 (2016) (statement of Dr. Catherine Ferrier, President, Physicians Alliance against Euthanasia), available at https://openparliament.ca/committees/justice/42-1/13/dr-catherine-fer
rier-1/.
43. Physician D, supra note 23.
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capacity for medical decision making) when they request assisted suicide or euthanasia, and must be competent when it is performed. The
ability of physicians to perform capacity assessments is disputed, particularly in the case of palliative care patients. On the one hand, it is
argued that assessing patient competence for euthanasia requires significant expertise that is not necessarily present for the majority of
physicians. 44 On the other, plaintiffs in the Carter case convinced the
trial court judge that obtaining informed consent presented no more
difficulty in the case of assisted suicide and euthanasia than in seeking
or refusing medical treatment. 45 It is instructive to set these different
viewpoints side by side:
The decision to have medical aid in dying requires
significant “meta” thought
and reflection. It is more
complex than even a decision about level of care, antibiotic
treatment
for
pneumonia, or blood pressure pills. It is even at a different level than the choice
to take chemotherapy or
not.

Dr. Ganzini, a geriatric psychiatrist and Professor of
psychiatry and medicine,
disputes the assertion that
the decision to end one’s life
is necessarily cognitively
demanding. Dr. Ganzini
cites the decision whether to
undergo a neurosurgical
procedure as an example of a
cognitively demanding one,
since the risks, benefits, and
various trade-offs between
short-term and long-term
gains can be very complex
and challenging to understand.

All of our patients are vulnerable, many of them have
concomitant
psychiatric
disorders, and almost all of
them are demoralized to a
certain extent that is normal
in the context of a lifethreatening illness. These

In contrast, she says, the
risks and benefits of a lethal
prescription are straightforward and not cognitively
complex. The risk is that the
prescription
might
not
work; the benefit is that the
patient’s life will end at a

44. Id.
45. Carter v. Canada, [2012] BCSC 866, ¶ 831 (Can.).
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time of her choosing. 47

gravity of deciding to end
one’s own life. 46 (emphasis
added)

The italicized passages demonstrate that different underlying
philosophical or ethical views about life and life-ending acts can significantly affect one’s views about the existence and nature of risk.
The risk perceived by Physician D is that the patient might die. On
the other hand, the risk perceived by Dr. Ganzini is that the patient
might live (at least, for a time). A life-or-death decision has, for Physician D, a completely different significance than it has for Dr. Ganzini. This issue cannot be avoided in capacity assessments. One physician who does many capacity assessments explains that each
assessment is made within the context of the kind of decision-making
contemplated. It is influenced by the risks involved in the decision,
life-or-death consequences calling for the highest level of capacity. 48
A patient who might be considered competent to decide whether to
take a daily aspirin might not be considered competent to make a decision about a neurosurgical procedure. Similarly, Canadian Psychiatric Association President Dr. K. Sonu Gaind explained that the kind
of capacity assessment used in therapy based on the recovery model is
not appropriate for euthanasia or assisted suicide.
He says that in the recovery model, “patients want to be able to
make their own decisions, even if [those decisions] are mistakes. The
idea is that they want to learn from their mistakes. In the case of this
particular decision, you can’t learn from it if it’s a mistake.” 49
Rigorous capacity assessment is particularly important for dissenting palliative care physicians “who are especially sensitive to the
risk of allowing medical aid in dying in a case where the person was

2015.

46. Physician D, supra note 23.
47. Carter, [2012] BCSC 866, ¶ 775 (emphasis added).
48. Physician H, explanation offered at meeting in the presence of the author, Oct. 10,

49. Special Joint Comm. on Physician-Assisted Dying, 42nd Parliament, 1st Sess., Meeting No. 6 (2016) (statement of Dr. K, Sonu Gaind), available at http://www.parl.gc.ca/
HousePublications/Publication.aspx?Language=e&Mode=1&Parl=42&Ses=1&DocId=8075735
#Int-8772921 (last visited Apr. 8, 2017).

352

MURPHY.MACRO.4.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

333]

5/31/2017 5:39 PM

Legalization of Assisted Suicide and Euthanasia

not truly competent to decide.” 50 The stress caused by this possibility
is exacerbated if there is concern that those doing capacity assessments for euthanasia and assisted suicide share Dr. Ganzini’s bias in
favor of the procedures. 51

2. Dissenting physicians generally
The possibility that a formal complaint may be made for refusing
to provide or facilitate euthanasia or assisted suicide is a source of
continuing stress. Complaints can be made by a patient or a patient’s
family to immediate supervisors, to hospital authorities, to medical
regulators and to human rights commissions, which, in some cases,
are notoriously hostile to physician freedom of conscience and religion. 52
To preserve my own sanity under the stress that this uncertainty
and constant threat can cause . . . I will need to practice my craft
with the knowledge that I may lose everything that I’ve worked so
hard to become as a healer for the sick.
[L]osing my license to practice would essentially eliminate any further possibility of working in [province]. 53

One physician, hearing that the regional health authority might
expect the collaboration of physicians with euthanasia and assisted suicide of their patients in the local hospital, decided to give up hospital
privileges should that come to pass. 54
Some are closing their practices to new patients to reduce the risk
that they will encounter someone likely to ask for euthanasia or assisted suicide, or who will respond to refusal by making a formal
complaint to state authorities. 55 The mutual trust that is supposed to
50. Physician D, supra note 23.
51. Physician E, supra note 24.
52. For example, in 2008 the Ontario Human Rights Commission told the College of
Physicians and Surgeons of Ontario that physicians must essentially check their personal views
at the door in providing medical care. Submission of the Ontario Human Rights Commission

to the College of Physicians and Surgeons of Ontario Regarding the draft policy, “Physicians
and the Ontario Human Rights Code”, ONT. HUMAN RIGHTS COMM’N,

http://www.ohrc.on.ca/en/submission-ontario-human-rights-commission-college-physiciansand-surgeons-ontario-regarding-draft-0 (last visited Apr. 8, 2016).
53. Physician A, supra note 26.
54. Personal Communication of Physician F and the author (Oct. 09, 2016) [hereinafter
Physician F].
55. Personal Communication of Physician C and the author (July 30, 2016) [hereinafter
Physician C].
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exist in a physician-patient relationship is being displaced by distrust. 56
Even so, dissenting physicians may also make extra efforts to establish a bond of trust with patients that may serve both patient and
physician well if a conflict arises.
I intend to build up trust and respect in any doctor patient relationship and continue to be pleasant, helpful and go the extra distance
to build goodwill for the day someone asks me for help in MAID,
and I will do what I usually do, get to the bottom of the request,
and problem solve around that request. 57

In response to the demand for effective referral by the College of
Physicians and Surgeons of Ontario, one physician decided to leave
medical practice.
I refuse to let anyone or any organization dictate my moral code. . .
I have practiced full scope family medicine, including palliative care
for the past 37 years and solely palliative care for the past 3 years. I
have no wish to stop. But I will not be told that I must go against
my moral conscience to provide standard of care. 58

A physician in another province suggested outright defiance:
“[W]e should make them take our licenses, not retire.” 59
Dissenting physicians in institutions work within a matrix of policies that may or may not be satisfactory; notwithstanding claims (sincere or disingenuous) that they are respectful of freedom of conscience and religion.
[I]f I am required to abide by all [institutional] policies, including
this most recent objectionable one, I may no longer be able to work
at this [institution]. [L]osing my current job [would] not [be] so bad.
I can always set up my own private practice outside the [institution] . . . If I am forced out of necessity to leave the practice of medicine, I may try to get into another area related to my field . . . . 60

Transferring to a different institution, or to a different kind of institution is a viable strategy in some cases. A denominational institu56. Physician A, supra note 26; Physician C, supra note 55.
57. Physician C, supra note 55.
58. Letter from Nancy L. Naylor, Physician, responding to Stephen J. Genuis SJ, Clinical Professor, U. Alta. (Apr. 17, 2016), in Emerging Assault on Freedom of Conscience, 62
CAN. FAM. PHYSICIAN 293 (2016) (responding to Commentary).
59. Personal Communication of Physician G and the author (Apr. 17, 2016), [hereinafter
Physician G].
60. Physician A, supra note 26.
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tion may provide a safe haven for dissenting physicians in some jurisdictions. Alternatively, dissenters might find a position in institutions
caring for those legally ineligible for euthanasia or assisted suicide—a
hospital for children and adolescents, for example. 61 The latter strategy may provide only temporary protection, given the pressure to
make the procedures available to such groups.

D. Particular Problems
1. Inflicting death to control death
Public campaigns and court cases leading to the legalization of
euthanasia and assisted suicide have always emphasized hard cases.
“When they were preparing the field, getting ready for the implementation of the law, training always focused on nightmare scenario:
patients in agony, intractable pain, etc.” 62
What some dissenting physicians have observed in reality is quite
different—the killing of patients who are not in pain or whose pain is
adequately controlled; who do not, upon enquiry, report that they are
suffering, and who could have lived for weeks or months longer had
they not been lethally injected. 63 In such cases, a dissenting physician
may conclude that the real purpose of euthanasia and assisted suicide
is to control death by inflicting death. 64
Particularly in these situations, when maintaining a pretence of
complete normality and equanimity is likely to be especially difficult,
it is natural to become preoccupied with other duties that allow interaction to be minimized or avoided. In the end, dissenting physicians
may be left with feelings of guilt for having somehow failed the patient or the patient’s family. 65 On the other hand, if they successfully
manage the pretence of normality and continue interactions with patients, family and colleagues, they might well be left with feelings of
guilt for having contributed to the patient’s death.

2. Cooperation vs. collaboration
The account of one physician highlights the distinction between
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.

Physician E, supra note 24.

Id.

Physicians B, supra note 31; Physician E, supra note 24.
Physicians B, supra note 31.

Id.
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law and practice environments:
To have an office beside the room where euthanasia is done is like
being a collaborator. The law allows conscientious objection, but
the environment makes him a collaborator—part of the system that
is making euthanasia happen. One can collaborate, or one can go
away. There are no other options. 66

This also illustrates how moral reasoning and individual sensitivity affect the impact of legalization on dissenting physicians. Other
dissenters might be able to work in this environment, not feeling implicated by what they consider to be their mere presence. In contrast,
this physician feels like a clerk in a concentration camp: an active
contributor to an immoral system, even if not directly involved in
killing. This reaction merits closer examination.
S.S. guard Oskar Gröning was a clerk in a concentration camp—
Auschwitz. He was convicted in 2015 as an accomplice to the murder
of 300,000 Hungarian Jews, though he had never been directly involved in killing anyone. At first glance this lends credibility to Physician E’s analogy.
However, the judge did not find that Gröning had merely been
present at Auschwitz. Gröning was convicted because his role at the
camp, minor though it was, had directly contributed to the smooth
running of an extremely efficient machine of death and deception.
He had been an integral cog in the machine of the Auschwitz extermination apparatus. 67
Unlike Gröning, Physician E is not working in a facility dedicated exclusively to murder, nor do his/her duties or interaction with
patients contribute to or support euthanasia, as Gröning’s work undoubtedly contributed to genocide. Yet Physician E’s tone of voice
and emotion make clear that his/her reference to a clerk in a concentration camp is not merely a rhetorical flourish or polemical ploy.
What is the reason for this conviction?
A hint comes from his/her reaction to an associate who argues
that palliative care physicians are obliged to support and affirm a patient’s choice of euthanasia because such accompaniment is fundamental to the essence of good palliative care. As we have seen, this is
a contentious and debatable claim, and Physician E could certainly
66. Physician E, supra note 24.
67. Kate Connolly, Accountant of Auschwitz jailed for the murder of 300,000 Jews, THE
GUARDIAN (July 15, 2015, 1:25 PM), https://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/jul/15/accoun
tant-oskar-groning-auschwitz-jailed-for-the-of-300000-jews.
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argue the point. Instead, he/she feels he/she can no longer speak with
the associate.
This reaction seems consistent with Physician E’s sense that
he/she is no longer welcome in the new practice environment. “It has
quickly become normal to kill other people, and in this environment
the realistic options are to provide the treatment or leave . . . . [I]t is
necessary to retire from patients and from the group.” 68
Faced with colleagues celebrating a successful lethal infusion, for
example, professional etiquette and social convention forbid the expression of moral disapproval of euthanasia. Even if disapproval is expressed respectfully, doing so persistently would likely result in discipline for disruptive behavior. 69 This may explain why Physician E
feels that he/she can no longer speak with the associate who is advocating Belgian-style euthanasia accompaniment.
One can collaborate, or one can go away. There are no other options.
One piece of the puzzle is still missing. Physician E is unable to
express disapproval of euthanasia in the practice environment, but
does nothing to contribute to it. He or she simply continues to treat
and care for his or her patients. How can this constitute collaboration
with homicide? Is this not mere presence?
The missing piece of the puzzle is in plain view and has already
been mentioned: it is the pretence of non-judgementalism that forbids the expression of moral disapproval of euthanasia.
Notice the pretence of non-judgementalism. In reality, the expression of moral disapproval is not forbidden in the practice environment. On the contrary, it is expected, notably in the face of offensive remarks about race, ethnicity, religion, sexual orientation, age,
physical appearance, or socioeconomic or educational status; 70 it may
even be required. 71 The expression of moral disapproval in the face of
perceived wrongdoing is normative, not exceptional.
68. Physician E, supra note 24.
69. “Disruptive behaviour is demonstrated when inappropriate conduct, whether in
words or action, interferes with, or has the potential to interfere with, quality health care delivery.” C. OF PHYSICIANS & SURGEONS OF ONT., GUIDEBOOK FOR MANAGING DISRUPTIVE
PHYSICIAN BEHAVIOUR 5–7 (2008), available at, http://www.cpso.on.ca/CPSO/media/upload
edfiles/policies/policies/Disruptive_Behaviour_Guidebook.pdf.
70. The Are You an ALLY? Campaign, MOUNTSINAI.ON.CA, http://www.mountsinai
.on.ca/about_us/human-rights/ally/allyhttp://www.mountsinai.on.ca/about_us/human-rights
/ally (last visited Apr. 8, 2017).
71. ONT. HUMAN. RIGHTS COMM’N, HUMAN RIGHTS AT WORK — THIRD EDITION,
pt. III (2008), available at, http://www.ohrc.on.ca/en/human-rights-work-2008-third-edition.
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However, where euthanasia or assisted suicide are delivered as
medical treatment, the assumption that they are morally acceptable
cannot be openly challenged. Racism can be openly challenged, but
not deliberate homicide. Hence, dissenting physicians are obliged to
dissemble, to maintain the appearance of complete normality and
equanimity as arrangements are made to kill people, and while people
are being killed down the hall. In these circumstances, that someone
should feel that he/she is a collaborator—a part of the system—is not
surprising.
This might be better appreciated if one imagines a situation in
which a physician, sensitive to racism, finds himself in a practice environment in which racism is normative, moral disapproval of racism
forbidden, and he is expected to act as if nothing is amiss. Imagine, as
well, that the full weight of the state, the profession and public opinion supports such a status quo. It would not be surprising if, like Physician E, he was to conclude that continuing to work in such an environment is a form of collaboration, and felt the need to leave.

IV. M ORALITY AND THE L AW
Turning from the particular experiences of dissenting physicians
to foundational issues, it is important to recognize that law is aimed
at accomplishing or protecting what is thought to be good and avoiding what is thought to be evil. Thus, morality precedes and drives
law, and the law enforces and teaches the morality that informs it. 72
This is exemplified by the trial court decision in Carter v. Canada.

A. Carter v. Canada
The Carter case began in 2011. The plaintiffs claimed that the
laws prohibiting physician assisted suicide and euthanasia were unconstitutional because they violated equality rights (Section 15
rights) 73 and rights to life, liberty, and security of the person (Section
7 rights). 74

ics.

72. In this paper, morality is shorthand for moral philosophy, and synonymous with eth-

73. Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act, 1982, c 11 (U.K.). Section 15(1): “Every individual is equal

before and under the law and has the right to the equal protection and equal benefit of the law
without discrimination and, in particular, without discrimination based on race, national or
ethnic origin, colour, religion, sex, age or mental or physical disability.”
74. Id. Section 1:. “The Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms guarantees the rights
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B. Legal Reasoning

1. Equality rights
With respect to equality claims (Section 15), British Columbia
Supreme Court Madame Justice Smith observed that the law did not
prevent able-bodied people from committing suicide in order to relieve themselves of the burden of pain or suffering. In contrast, she
said, disabled people may not be able to commit suicide without assistance, and were thus forced to endure pain or suffering. 75 She decided
that the law, though neutral on its face, disproportionately affected
disabled people, 76 thus creating a distinction based on physical disability that was discriminatory. 77
With the finding of illicit discrimination, the burden of proof
shifted to the defendant governments to demonstrate that nothing
short of absolute prohibition could achieve the purpose of the law.
This was narrowly construed as the protection of vulnerable people
in moments of weakness from being induced to commit suicide. 78
The defendants had to prove that there was no viable alternative to
absolute prohibition that would less seriously infringe the plaintiffs’
rights. 79 This was precisely what the defendants did claim. 80
However, the assertion that only a blanket prohibition could be
effective rested on the premise that even one wrongful death was too
many: 81 that safeguards could be considered effective only if they absolutely eliminated any possibility of error. Madam Justice Smith rejected this zero-tolerance standard. 82 Instead, having narrowly construed the purpose of the law, she accepted the plaintiffs’ argument
that it could not possibly be to prevent all wrongful deaths, because
wrongful deaths could occur as a result of accepted but unregulated
end-of-life practices like refusing or withdrawing treatment. 83
and freedoms set out in it subject only to such reasonable limits prescribed by law as can be demonstrably justified in a free and democratic society.”
75. Carter v. Canada, [2012] BCSC 866, ¶¶ 1039, 1050, 1064.
76. Id. ¶¶ 1032, 1036.
77. Id. ¶¶ 1156, 1159, 1161.
78. Id. at ¶¶ 926, 1184.
79. Id. at ¶¶ 1172, 1232.
80. Id. at ¶ 359.
81. Id. at ¶¶ 1192–96, 1230, 1236, 1349, 1351. The term wrongful death was rejected by
the judge, but for the sake of convenience, she used it in the ruling nonetheless. Id. ¶¶. 755–58.
82. Id. at ¶ 1353.
83. Id. at ¶¶ 435, 1198–99, 1230–31, 1237, 1240.
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Combined with the narrow construction of the purpose of the
law, rejection of the zero-tolerance standard was fatal to the defendants’ case. Their witnesses produced evidence of risk, and the judge
was willing to accept that evidence, 84 but the problem was judicially
defined as one of managing or reducing risk, not eliminating it altogether. 85 Thus, Madam Justice Smith ruled that the defendant governments had failed to prove that the protection of vulnerable persons in moments of weakness could not be achieved by means less
drastic than absolute prohibition, such as a stringently limited, carefully monitored system of exceptions. 86

2. Life, liberty and security of the person
Turning to life, liberty, and security of the person (Section 7),
Madam Justice Smith agreed that the right to life is engaged only
when there is a threat of death, 87 but added (apparently as a kind of
extension of that principle) that the prohibition of assisted suicide has
the effect of shortening the lives of persons who fear that they will
become unable to commit suicide later, and therefore take their lives
at an earlier date than would otherwise be necessary. 88
With the infringement of Section 7 rights established, the onus
shifted to the defendant governments to prove that the legislation
was not overbroad. 89 Once more, given the narrowly construed purpose of the law and risk management approach, they failed.90 By concluding that the absolute prohibition was overbroad, the judge again
affirmed that the purpose of the law could be served by “a system
with properly designed and administered safeguards.” 91 While it was
not necessary in view of her finding on overbreadth, the judge went
on to rule that the adverse effects of the law were grossly disproportionate to its limited purpose. 92
The Supreme Court of Canada affirmed the trial court judge’s
conclusion that the existing law violated rights to life, liberty, and se84.
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.
90.
91.
92.
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E.g., id. at ¶¶ 653, 815.
Id. at ¶ 1240.
Id. at ¶ 1243.
Id. at ¶ 1320.
Id. at ¶¶ 17, 1322.
Id. at ¶ 1339.
Id. at ¶¶ 1362–63, 1371.
Id. at ¶ 1367.
Id. at ¶¶. 1372, 1378.
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curity of the person (Section 7) because it was overbroad. It declined
to rule on her finding that it was grossly disproportionate and violated equality rights (Section 15). 93
With summary of the legal reasoning in hand, we now consider
the moral reasoning that determined the trajectory and outcome of
the case.

A. The Morality Preceding and Driving Carter
1. Part VII: judicial dicta
The trial judge’s reasoning in Carter began with the fact that neither suicide nor attempted suicide was illegal. 94 In Part VII of her ruling, she reviewed the “ethical debate” about assisted suicide 95 to address the question of whether or not it would ever be ethical—not
legal—for a physician to provide assisted suicide or euthanasia at the
request of a competent, informed patient. 96
Her review of ethical issues was unsatisfactory because what was
necessary to understand them and controversies associated with endof-life practices was lacking. 97 Nonetheless, she claimed that “[t]he
preponderance of the evidence from ethicists is that there is no ethical distinction between physician-assisted death and other end-of-life
practices whose outcome is highly likely to be death,” adding that she
found the “arguments” for this view “persuasive.” 98 Similarly, she was
persuaded by “the arguments” that there was no ethical distinction
between suicide and assisted suicide in the circumstances contemplated by the plaintiffs’ application. 99 Whatever merit the judge found in
the arguments, the evidence, on her own account, did not support
such findings. The evidence consisted of a sampling of conflicting
ethical opinions provided by parties to a contentious suit and the expression of doubts and difficulties by some of the witnesses. 100 It ac93.
94.
95.
96.
97.

Carter v. Canada, [2015] S.C.R. 331, ¶¶ 56, 90, 93.
Carter, [2012] BCSC 866, ¶¶ 102–07.
See id. at ¶¶ 161–358.
Id. at ¶¶ 161–62, 183, 316.
For a detailed critique, see Sean Murphy, Legalizing Therapeutic Homicide and Assisted Suicide: A Tour of Carter v. Canada, PROTECTION OF CONSCIENCE PROJECT,

http://www.consciencelaws.org/law/commentary/legal073-001.aspx (last visited Apr. 8, 2017).
98. Carter, [2012] BCSC 866, ¶ 335 (emphasis added); Id. ¶ 1336 (referring to this view
as “the preponderant ethical opinion.”).
99. Id. at ¶ 339 (emphasis added).
100. Id. at ¶¶ 336–38.
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tually demonstrated what the judge herself admitted: “[T]he question
still remains open whether an ethical distinction is maintainable between withholding or withdrawing life-sustaining treatment and palliative sedation on the one hand, and physician-assisted death on the
other.” 101
Madam Justice Smith’s reference to a “preponderance of evidence” was a misapplication of an evidentiary rule developed for other purposes. The “preponderance of evidence” or “balance of probabilities” rule pertains to findings of contested facts in civil litigation,
not to the evaluation of contested ethical beliefs. A judge cannot
properly make a finding of fact to the effect that ethical position A is
correct and ethical position B is not: that, for example, capital punishment is ethical, and those who think otherwise are mistaken.
Further, the binary system of reasoning and rules about standards
and burdens of proof that are sufficient for the purposes of a common
law civil proceeding 102 fall short of what is normative in other disciplines. For example, “more likely than not” or 51% probability is sufficient to prove facts required for judicial decision-making in civil litigation, 103 but not for medical decision-making. 104
What is noteworthy is that nothing in Part VII materially contributed to the judge’s finding that the law prohibiting physician assisted suicide/euthanasia was unconstitutional. 105 The whole of Part
VII is best described as the “considered enunciations of the judge’s
opinion on [points] not arising for decision” that went beyond what
was necessary for the decision: 106 the classic definition of “dicta.” 107
Nonetheless, Part VII is important because it provides evidence of
the moral falsework the judge used in the construction of the judgement.
101. Id. at ¶ 334.
102. In Re B (Children) [2008] UKHL 35, [2008] 2 FLR 141 (appeal taken from Eng.),
available
at
http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/ld200708/ldjudgmt/jd080611/
child-1.htm.
103. McIver v. Power, 1998 CanLII 4858 (Can. P.E.I. S.C.), ¶ 5, available at
https://www.canlii.org/en/pe/pesctd/doc/1998/1998canlii4858/1998canlii4858.html.
104. Snell v. Farell, [1990] 2 S.C.R. 311 (Can.) (“Medical experts ordinarily determine
causation in terms of certainties whereas a lesser standard is demanded by the law.”).
105. This is apparent in the summary of the judgement when the judge introduced her
ruling. See Carter, [2012] BCSC 866, ¶¶ 3–18.
106. MACKAY OF CLASHFERN, HALSBURY’S LAWS OF ENGLAND (Helen Halvey & David
Hay eds., 5th ed. 2009).
107. “Obiter dicta” and “judicial dicta.” The former are often described as the “passing
remarks” of a judge. Part VII of Carter, expressing additional considered opinions, falls within
the latter category.
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2. Morally acceptable suicide
This rested on her belief that suicide could be morally acceptable—not that it always is, but that it can be. 108 The logically prior discussion of the morality of suicide was avoided because the plaintiffs
had brought a case for assisted suicide and euthanasia (thus assuming
the acceptability of suicide). Madam Justice Smith expressly adopted
this approach in her analysis. 109 None of the defendants or interveners contested that assumption, 110 even to the limited extent of arguing that the morality of suicide cannot be established without reference to some moral framework. 111
The judge believed that suicide could be moral if it resulted from
a “sound, rational and well reasoned” decision by someone not suffering from clinical depression, mental illness, substance abuse, trauma
or similar psychosocial factors. 112 The latter she appears to have
classed as “traditionally-defined suicide,” 113 – “suicide arising out of
mental illness or transitory sadness.” 114 She believed that suicide
could be rational 115 and appears to have accepted the view of Professor Margaret Battin that it would be rational to choose suicide in order to avoid serious future evils. 116

3. From suicide to assisted suicide
The belief that suicide can be moral implies that assisted suicide
can be moral. Thus, the judge said that where suicide is moral, the
distinction between suicide and assisted suicide “vanishes” when “the
108. Carter, [2012] BCSC 866, ¶ 339. The judge uses the term “ethical,” not “moral,”
and more frequently employs the former, but she treats them as synonyms when addressing the
question, “Does the law attempt to uphold a conception of morality inconsistent with the consensus in Canadian society?”; id. at ¶¶ 340–58.
109. Id. ¶¶ 175, 180–81.
110. The nearest approach to a challenge appears to have come from Canada, which asserted that “suicide is not a fundamental social institution,” and emphasized that “suicide is not
condoned, let alone recognized as a legal right.,” Id. ¶¶ 1146–47. However, it also argued that
disabled people were not disadvantaged by the prohibition of assisted suicide because they
could still commit suicide “by refusing treatment, hydration or nutrition” which implied that
suicide could be considered advantageous. Id. ¶ 1049.
111. MARGARET SOMERVILLE, DEATH TALK: THE CASE AGAINST EUTHANASIA & AND
PHYSICIAN-ASSISTED SUICIDE 103 (2001).
112. Carter, [2012] BCSC 866, ¶ 813–14.
113. Id. at ¶¶ 812, 827, 833.
114. Id. at ¶ 1262.
115. Id. at ¶ 339.
116. Id. at ¶ 842.
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patient’s decision for suicide is entirely rational and autonomous, it is
in the patient’s best interest, and the patient has made an informed
request for assistance.” 117
Further, moral conduct is associated with the protection or pursuit of the good. Thus, a belief that suicide can be moral naturally invites the conclusion that it can be beneficial: “in the patient’s best interest.” The plaintiffs asserted that suicide can be in the best interest
of a patient if it prevents or avoids needless suffering. 118 Indeed, the
basis of their case was that the prohibition of assisted suicide denied
them a good to which they were entitled, and to which others had access.
Quite apart from burdens of proof in law, this effectively shifted
the rhetorical burden of proof to those opposed to assisted suicide. It
put them in the position of having to argue that people should not be
allowed access to something that could be moral and beneficial. 119

4. From assisted suicide to euthanasia
In circumstances in which suicide and assisted suicide are moral,
if the person seeking suicide is unable to perform the lethal act even
with assistance, euthanasia in response to a request from that person
would seem to be moral. 120 This moral equivalence was arguably implicit in the term “assisted dying,” which, in the ruling, includes both
assisted suicide and voluntary euthanasia. 121 Thus, beginning with the
premise that suicide can be moral and beneficial, the judge concluded
that assisted suicide and euthanasia can be moral and beneficial.
Why, then, should assisted suicide and euthanasia be prohibited by
law?

5. Purpose of the law
Consistent with her belief that suicide could be a moral act, the
judge concluded that the purpose of the law was not to prevent sui117. Id. at ¶ 339; See id. ¶ 237 (quoting Professor Wayne Sumner).
118. Id. at ¶ 234 (quoting Professor Wayne Sumner).
119. This may explain, in part, why Professor Margaret Somerville, upon reading the
judgement, was left with “a strong impression that [the judge] is far from neutral about physician-assisted suicide and euthanasia” and that she favoured the interventions in some cases.
Somerville, Bird, supra note 1, at 120.
120. Carter, [2012] BCSC 866 ¶¶ 234–36 (quoting Professor Wayne Sumner); Id. at ¶
242 (quoting Dr. Upshur).
121. Id. at ¶¶ 23, 39.
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cide by absolutely everyone for any reason. Per the judge, the sole
purpose of the law against assisted suicide was to prevent suicides by
vulnerable people who, in a moment of weakness, might succumb to
suggestions or pressures by others. 122 The ruling seems to have assumed that the law against consensual homicide served the same purpose. The narrow construction of the purpose of the law illustrated
common ground among the parties to the case. 123

6. Morality and risk
This chain of reasoning can be broken between suicide and assisted suicide. Even if suicide per se can be moral, it can be argued
that assisted suicide is a different kind of act because “it is action not
by a person on herself but by one person upon another.” 124 Based on
this distinction, it can be argued that, whatever the moral status of
suicide, assisted suicide is immoral if it entails harm for others or society not entailed by suicide per se. It can also be argued that assisted
suicide is immoral if it entails the risk of harm for others or society.
In either case, however, proof of harm or risk is required to sustain
these moral arguments, and it is also necessary to establish at what
point the risk or harm becomes morally unacceptable.
This was the approach taken by the defendant governments and
interveners, and this was the focus of much of the evidence and argument. However, the parties argued as if only points of law and legal principle were relevant. None appear to have recognized the intuitive and implicit moral assumptions and reasoning that informed the
arguments.
The Carter trial court decision demonstrates that when serious
moral issues are in play (as they are when the subject is killing people
or helping them to commit suicide), a judge will either assume or
construct a moral justification that supports a decision.
The justification is like the falsework used to support a masonry
arch while stones are being laid. The falsework is removed when the
arch is complete, becoming invisible, as it were, though implied in
the outline of the stonework that remains.

122. Id. at ¶¶ 16, 926, 1116, 1126, 1166, 1184–85, 1187–88, 1190, 1199, 1348, 1362. On
this point, the judge purported to follow Rodriguez, but Rodriguez can yield a broader interpretation.
123. Id. at ¶¶ 237, 339, 1124, 1136, 1185, 1190, 1362.
124. Id. at ¶ 237 (quoting Professor Wayne Sumner).
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Similarly, moral beliefs that provide the falsework necessary for
the construction of a judicial decision may be overlooked or even denied because they lie outside the spectrum of elements identifiable as
ratio in common law. Nonetheless, the moral falsework essential to
the construction of a ruling may be implied in it and discernable as
dicta in the text.

B. Carter and Fleming v. Ireland & Ors
Some support for this proposition is found in Fleming v. Ireland
& Ors, a decision of the High Court of Ireland in which the judges
considered and declined to follow the Carter trial court decision,

even though they had before them much of the same evidence and
arguments of the same kind. 125
Fleming can be distinguished from Carter in a number of respects, including the differences between Canadian and Irish jurisprudence on proportionality, 126 claims and counterclaims as presented, 127 the quality of evidence provided by defendant witnesses 128 and
the acuity of government counsel, at least as reflected in the written
judgements. 129 Nonetheless, the Irish court made a number of striking statements that reflect underlying moral views about suicide notably different from Carter. The Court in Fleming stated: “It is nevertheless idle to suggest that even the intentional taking of another’s
life—even if this is consensual—or actively assisting them so to do
does not have objective moral dimensions.”130 In the same paragraph,
instead of assuming that suicide could be a moral act or a benefit, the
Court referred to “obvious and self-evident considerations” against
legalization of assisted suicide, including “deterring suicide and anything that smacks of the ‘normalisation’ of suicide.” 131
The Irish court also strongly and repeatedly emphasized that
“there is an enormous and defining difference” between physicianassisted suicide and discontinuing medical treatment to allow a patient to die a natural death. 132
125.
126.
127.
128.
129.
130.
131.
132.
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Fleming v. Ireland & Ors [2013] IEHC 2 (Ir.).
Id. at ¶¶ 87, 90.
Id. at ¶¶ 6, 9.
Id. at ¶¶ 34–47.
Id. at ¶¶ 30–33.
Id. at ¶ 69.
Id. (emphasis added).
Id. at ¶ 93; see id. at ¶¶ 53, 55.
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Considering much of the same evidence heard by Madame Justice
Smith about Belgium, the Netherlands and Switzerland, as well as
her discussion of the evidence, the Court rejected her conclusions. 133
Of particular interest, the Irish court stressed the importance of
maintaining an attitude unfavourable to assisted suicide, and disapproved of popular and official lack of concern about potentially nonvoluntary homicide where euthanasia is allowed. 134 All of this indicates a moral outlook decidedly unsuited to constructing a legal ruling favourable to euthanasia.
It appears that the Irish judges and Madame Justice Smith came
to radically different conclusions about the risks presented by legalization of assisted suicide and euthanasia because their moral beliefs
affected their evaluation of evidence and the conclusions drawn from
it.

V. T HE O BLIGATION TO K ILL

A. Canadian Medical Association Approves Euthanasia, Assisted
Suicide
Until the end of 2014, the Canadian Medical Association
(“CMA”) opposed the participation of physicians in euthanasia and
assisted suicide. In 2014 and 2015, as the Carter case was making its
way through the courts and after, the CMA consulted its members
about euthanasia and assisted suicide. 135
The most plausible rendering of the results indicates that the
great majority of physicians—from 63% to 78%—were opposed to
both euthanasia and assisted suicide, and that support for the procedures among favourably disposed physicians was highly volatile, depending heavily upon the diagnosis, the condition of the patient and

133. Id. at ¶ 104.
134. Id. at ¶ 67.
135. The CMA had about 81,000 members in 2014 and 2015. Five thousand members
(6.2%) were surveyed in 2014. This was supplemented by town hall meetings with the public
and member-only meetings held across the country. In 2015, on-line surveys were completed
by about 1407 members (about 1.7%) and 372 members (about 0.5%). 595 members registered
for an on-line member dialogue, but only 150 actually contributed to the discussion. CAN.
MED. ASSOC., END-OF-LIFE CARE: A NATIONAL DIALOGUE 1 (June 2014), available at
https://www.cma.ca/Assets/assets-library/document/en/advocacy/end-of-life-care-report-e.pdf;
CAN. MED. ASSOC., END-OF-LIFE CARE: A NATIONAL DIALOGUE: CMA MEMBER
CONSULTATION REPORT 1–2 (July 2014), available at https://www.cma.ca/Assets/assets-library
/document/en/advocacy/Englishreportfinal.pdf.
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the rigour of the regulatory regime; significantly fewer physicians
were willing to provide euthanasia than assisted suicide. 136
Nonetheless, in 2014 the CMA Board of Directors decided to position the Association to take a leading role in implementing the new
regime should the Supreme Court strike down the law against the
procedures. 137
The Board secured support from the CMA membership for a position of neutrality, 138, which it drew to the attention of the Supreme
Court of Canada in its intervention in Carter. 139 It then reversed the
policy against physician participation in euthanasia and assisted suicide, recognizing both as end of life care. The new policy does not
limit the procedures to the terminally ill or those with uncontrollable
pain, nor does it exclude euthanasia for minors, the incompetent, or
the mentally ill. 140 The sole limiting criterion recognized is that set
by law. It affirmed the CMA’s support for patients’ access to the full
spectrum of end of life care that is legal in Canada—whatever that
might turn out to be.
The new policy was announced more than a month before the
Supreme Court ruled in Carter—probably with the reasonable expectation that the judges would read it before the ruling 141—which they

136. SEAN MURPHY, A UNIQUELY CANADIAN APPROACH TO FREEDOM OF
CONSCIENCE: EXPERTS RECOMMEND COERCION TO ENSURE DELIVERY OF EUTHANASIA
AND ASSISTED SUICIDE 46–61 (2016), available at http://www.consciencelaws.org/law/
commentary/legal073-012-004.aspx.
137. J. Blackmer & L.H. Francescutti, Canadian Medical Association Perspectives on
End-of-Life in Canada, 14 HEALTHCAREPAPERS 17, 17–20 (2014) [hereinafter BlackmerFrancescutti]; Simpson Aff. ¶ 10, June 5, 2014, Carter v. Canada, [2015] 1 S.C.R. 331 (Can.),
available
at
https://www.cma.ca/Assets/assets-library/document/en/advocacy/EOL/Su
preme-Court-Affidavit-Carter-Case.pdf [hereinafter Simpson Affidavit]; Sheryl Ubelacker,
Doctors ready for Supreme Court decision on assisted suicide, CTV NEWS (Feb. 5, 2015),
http://www.ctvnews.ca/health/doctors-ready-for-supreme-court-decision-on-assisted-suicide-1.
2223268.
138. CAN. MED. ASSOC., 147TH GENERAL COUNCIL DELEGATES MOTIONS: END-OFLIFE CARE: MOTION DM 5–6 (2014), available at https://www.cma.ca/Assets/assets-library/
document/en/GC/Delegate-Motions-end-of-life.pdf; Pat Rich, Physician perspective on
end-of-life issues fully aired, CANADIAN MEDICAL ASSOCIATION (Aug. 19, 2014),
https://www.cma.ca/En/Pages/Physician-perspective-on-end-of-life-issues-fully-aired.aspx.
139. Factum of Interviewer Can. Med. Ass. ¶¶ 27–28, Aug. 27, 2014, Carter, [2015] 1
S.C.R., available at http://www.consciencelaws.org/archive/documents/carter/ 2014-08-27cma-factum.pdf.
140. CMA Policy: Euthanasia and Assisted Death (Update 2014), CAN.ADIAN MED.ICAL
ASS’OCIATION
(2014),
https://www.cma.ca/Assets/assets-library/document/en/advocacy/
EOL/CMA_Policy_Euthanasia_Assisted%20Death_PD15-02-e.pdf.
141. Simpson Affidavit, supra note 137, ¶¶ 19–20.
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did. 142 By doing all of this, the Board of Directors effectively wrote a
blank cheque for the Supreme Court to legalize euthanasia and assisted suicide on any terms acceptable to the judges.
After the Carter ruling, CMA officials expressed surprise and
concern that it was much broader than they had anticipated. 143 In fact,
the legal eligibility criteria set by the Court were more restrictive
than CMA policy. If CMA officials did not get exactly what they
wished for in the Carter decision—and, perhaps, more than they bargained for—they nonetheless got exactly what they had worked for.
The full implications of the CMAs change of policy were not appreciated at the time, even by those involved in bringing it about.
The new policy is not one of neutrality. Instead, it acknowledges
homicide and suicide to be acceptable forms of medical treatment.
Only with developments made possible by the Carter ruling did the
long-term consequences of the policy change begin to come into
view. These are best considered within the context of the imposition
of an obligation to kill.

B. One Person’s Right is Another Person’s Obligation
Writing a few months before the CMA revised its policy on euthanasia and assisted suicide, CMA officials reflected on what such a
revision might mean.
“One person’s right is another person’s obligation, and sometimes a great burden,” they wrote. “And in this case, a patient’s right
to assisted dying becomes the physician’s obligation to take that patient’s life”—a prospect that terrified many physicians. 144 They were
terrified because homicide has traditionally been understood to be an
act of grave moral significance, even if killing per se does not necessarily entail an adverse moral or ethical judgement. 145
It might be suggested that a collective obligation to kill could be
142. Carter, [2015] 1 S.C.R. at 37.
143. John Geddes, Interview: The CMAs president on assisted dying: Dr. Chris Simpson
calls for a process to set new rules, MACLEANS (Feb. 6, 2015) [hereinafter Geddes],
http://www.macleans.ca/politics/ottawa/interview-the-cmas-president-on-assisted-dying/
[hereinafter Geddes]; Nicolas Santi, From Courtroom to Bedside - A Discussion with Dr. Jeff
Blackmer on the Implications of Carter v. Canada and Physician-Assisted Death, 5 UOJM 1, 1–
3 (2015), available at https://uottawa.scholarsportal.info/ojs/index.php/ uojm-jmuo/
article/view/1276/1270.
144. Blackmer-Francescutti, supra note 137.
145. TOM L. BEAUCHAMP & JAMES F. CHILDRESS, PRINCIPLES OF BIOMEDICAL ETHICS
176 (7th ed., 2013).
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imposed upon and discharged by the medical profession as a whole
without imposing an obligation to kill upon individual practitioners,
particularly those terror-struck by the prospect. 146 However, only if
at least one practitioner has an obligation can the medical profession
be said to have a collective obligation, so this approach neither negates an obligation to kill nor guarantees that it will not be imposed
upon individual members. Indeed, a Model Conscientious Objection
Policy for medical regulators proposed by a group of Canadian academics asserts that the “medical profession as a whole” is obliged “to
ensure . . . the provision of legally permissible and publicly funded
health services,” yet would force dissenting physicians to provide
morally contested services if non-dissenting colleagues are not readily
available. 147
An obligation to kill seems implicit in the rights language used by
euthanasia and assisted suicide activists, 148 and the media, 149 and the
Quebec euthanasia law. 150 It is implied in assertions by ethicists and
others that failure to kill patients or help them commit suicide
amounts to unethical abandonment of patients. 151
On the other hand, Joseph Arvay, counsel for the appellants in
Carter, assured the Supreme Court of Canada that “no one is suggesting that a physician who has a religious objection to assisting a
patient with his or her death must do so.” 152 He subsequently
146. One such model has been proposed by Holly Fernandez Lynch, who advocates for a
bifurcated model of medical professionalism in which the whole is recognized as greater than
the sum of its parts. HOLLY FERNANDEZ-LYNCH, CONFLICTS OF CONSCIENCE IN HEALTH
CARE: AN INSTITUTIONAL COMPROMISE 10 (2008) [hereinafter CONFLICTS].
147. Downie et al., supra note 25, at 30.
Dying
is
a
Right, DYING WITH DIGNITY CANADA,
148. Assisted
http://www.dyingwithdignity.ca/assisted_dying_is_a_right (last visited Apr. 8, 2016).
149. Sean Fine, Supreme Court rules that Canadians have a right to doctor assisted suicide, THE GLOBE &AND MAIL (Feb. 6, 2015, 5:29 AM), http://www.theglobeandmail.com/
news/national/supreme-court-rules-on-doctor-assisted-suicide/article22828437/.
150. Section 4 of Quebec’s Act Respecting End of Life Care states, “Every person whose
condition requires it has the right to receive end-of-life care, subject to the specific requirements established by this Act.” Subsections 3(3) and 3(6) clarify that this includes euthanasia
(medical aid in dying). ARELC, supra note 5, at 6.
151. Carter v. Canada, [2012] 287 C.C.C. 3d 1 (Can. B.C. S.C.), ¶¶ 239–40; Marcia Angell & Edward Lowenstein, Letter re: Redefining Physicians’ Role in Assisted Dying, 368 N.
ENG. J. MED. 485, 485–86 (2013), available at http://www.nejm.org/doi/full/
10.1056/NEJMc1209798.3.
152. Webcast of Arvay Oral Submission 74:45/491:20 – 75:05/491:20, Oct. 15, 2014,
Carter v. Canada [2015] 1 S.C.R. 5 (Can.), available at http://www.scc-csc.ca/case-dossier/info/
webcastview-webdiffusionvue-eng.aspx?cas=35591&urlen=http%3a%2f%2fwww4.insinc.com%
2fibc%2fmp%2fmd%2fopen_protected%2fc%2f486%2f1938%2f201410150500wv150en%2c0
01&urlfr=http%3a%2f%2fwww4.insinc.com%2fibc%2fmp%2fmd%2fopen_protected%2fc%2
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acknowledged before the Court that Carter “wasn’t a positive rights
case,” 153 which suggests that, at best, a “right” to euthanasia or assisted suicide based upon Carter is simply a right not to be prevented
from obtaining the services from a willing physician, entailing no obligation on the part of anyone else beyond a duty not to obstruct an
eligible candidate.
Consistent with this, the Supreme Court itself, in ruling in favour
of physician assisted suicide and euthanasia, stated that “nothing in
the declaration of invalidity which we propose to issue would compel
physicians to provide assistance in dying,” noting “that a physician’s
decision to participate in assisted dying is a matter of conscience and,
in some cases, of religious belief.” 154
The use of “physicians” (plural) in the first assertion and “physician” (singular) in the second, together with the alternative terms
“provide” and “participate” suggests that Carter imposes no duty to
kill upon either the profession as a whole or upon individual physicians. It merely authorizes (willing) physicians to provide euthanasia
and assisted suicide in the circumstances described by the Court.
Similarly, the amendment to the Criminal Code authorizing euthanasia and assisted suicide includes the statement, “nothing in this section compels an individual to provide or assist in providing medical
assistance in dying.” 155
Nonetheless, it will be seen that prominent Canadian academics
claim that physicians have an obligation to arrange for patients to be
killed and even to kill patients in circumstances defined by law. Unfortunately, it does not appear that the nature of these claims is sufficiently appreciated, probably because the obligation to kill is almost
never identified as such in the media and professional literature. The
2014 reference to it by CMA officials was a notable exception.
f486%2f1940%2f201410150500wv150en%2c001&date=2014-10-15.
153. Webcast of Arvay Oral Submission 167:15/205:09 – 167:48/205:09, Jan. 11, 2016,
Carter, [2015] 1 S.C.R, available at http://www.scc-csc.ca/case-dossier/info/webcastview-web
diffusionvue-eng.aspx?cas=35591&urlen=http%3a%2f%2fwww4.insinc.com%2fibc%2fmp%
2fmd%2fopen_protected%2fc%2f486%2f1938%2f201601110500wv150en%2c001&urlfr=http
%3a%2f%2fwww4.insinc.com%2fibc%2fmp%2fmd%2fopen_protected%2fc%2f486%2f1940
%2f201601110500wv150en%2c001&date=2016-01-11.
154. However, the Court concluded its comment on this point cautioning that it did not
intend to pre-empt the role of legislators and regulators, emphasizing that the rights of patients
and physicians will need to be reconciled. Carter, [2015] 1 S.C.R., ¶ 132 (emphasis added).
155. An Act to amend the Criminal Code and to make related amendments to other Acts
(medical assistance in dying), CRIM. CODE § 241.2(9), R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46 (Can.). S.C. 2016, c
3, 241.2(9) (Can.), available at http://www.parl.gc.ca/HousePublications/Publication
.aspx?Language=E&Mode=1&DocId=8384014.
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1. The nature of an obligation to kill
An obligation to kill must be distinguished from an authorization
to kill or a justification of killing. Soldiers and police are legally authorized to kill, and anyone may be legally justified in killing in selfdefence. But neither the authority to kill nor legal justifications for
killing amount to an obligation to kill. It is often on the contrary: for
example, a police constable who administers a coup-de-grâce to a
wounded bank robber is liable to be charged for murder. There is no
obligation to kill even in military combat; deliberately killing disabled
enemies is a crime. 156
Since an obligation to kill is not imposed even upon people
whose duties may entail killing, the imposition of an obligation to kill
upon physicians appears to be unique and extraordinary, but not unprecedented. An obligation to kill was formerly imposed on public
executioners. The essence of the obligation was captured by Blackstone: “[I]f, upon judgment to be hanged by the neck till he is dead,
the criminal be not thoroughly killed, but revives, the sheriff must
hang him again.” 157
That is what an obligation to kill would require of attending physicians should assisted suicide or euthanasia drugs not cause death as
expected. 158 They would be expected to take steps to ensure that the
patient is “thoroughly killed.” It thus seems likely that euthanasia will
be wanted at least as a backup for failed assisted suicide, just as abortion is wanted as a backup for failed contraception. 159 An obligation
to ensure the patient is “thoroughly killed” and the use of euthanasia
as a backup for failed physician assisted suicide are reflected in professional guidelines, most notably in the Netherlands, but also in
Quebec.

156. Oliver Moore, Former Canadian army officer accused of murder speaks out, THE
GLOBE & MAIL (Sept. 4, 2012), http://www.theglobeandmail.com/news/national/former-cana
dian-army-officer-accused-of-murder-speaks-out/article4518314/.
157. WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 406 (10th
ed., 1795), citing 2 Hal. P.C. 412, 2 Hawk. P.C. 463.
158. Johanna H. Groenewoudet. et. al., Clinical Problems with the Performance of Euthanasia and Physician-Assisted Suicide in the Netherlands, 342 N. ENG. J. MED. 551, 551–56
(2000).
159. Abortion a necessary option: advocate, TVNZ (Oct. 18, 2010),
http://tvnz.co.nz/health-news/abortion-necessary-option-advocate-3839309;
Planned
Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 856 (1992).

372

MURPHY.MACRO.4.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

333]

5/31/2017 5:39 PM

Legalization of Assisted Suicide and Euthanasia

2. The obligation to kill in the Netherlands and Quebec
Dutch guidelines acknowledge that assisted suicide is not a “preferred method” of causing the death of the patient because it may
take several hours 160 and complications can arise. If death does not
occur within an agreed-upon time (a maximum of two hours), physicians are to provide a lethal infusion. 161 It appears that an average of
thirty-six cases reported annually in the Netherlands involve failed or
unduly prolonged assisted suicides backed up by euthanasia. 162
In Quebec, where only physician-administered euthanasia is allowed, Quebec’s law requires physicians providing euthanasia to remain with the patient until death ensues, which at least implies an obligation to ensure that it does. 163 The obligation to kill is more
explicitly stated in professional guidelines, which emphasize the attending physicians’ responsibility “to ensure a respectful death, quick
and free of suffering.” 164

3. “Assisted suicide only” regimes
Where both assisted suicide and euthanasia are legal, as in the
Netherlands, a commitment to collaborate in suicide blends seamlessly into an obligation to kill; the attending physician can fulfil his
obligation by lethally injecting the patient. 165 In Canada, where the
law requires that a patient be competent at the time lethal medication
160. KNMG/KNMP, GUIDELINES FOR THE PRACTICE OF EUTHANASIA AND
PHYSICIAN—ASSISTED SUICIDE 13 (2012), available at https://www.google.ca/url?
sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=1&ved=0ahUKEwiO0a_G19PPAhVC0WMKHW9
mASAQFggeMAA&url=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.knmg.nl%2Fweb%2Ffile%3Fuuid%3D6dd
97d29-f731-4c43-9bf0-9d155bc7bdd2%26owner%3D5c945405-d6ca-4deb-aa16-7af2088aa173
%26contentid%3D224%26elementid%3D127002&usg=AFQjCNGXGj-UBUVMSK_WlMa4
Y8TkpHPdEQ [hereinafter KNMG/KNMP].
161. Id. at 17–18.
162. Sean Murphy, Euthanasia reported in Netherlands: statistics compiled from the Regional Euthanasia Review Committees’ Annual Reports, PROT. OF CONSCIENCE PROJECT
(Sept. 19, 2016), http://consciencelaws.org/archive/documents/Statistics/euthanasia-nether
lands.xlsx.
163. ARELC, supra note 5, § 30.
164. COLLÈGE DES MÉDECINS DU QUÉBEC, ORDRE DES PHARMACIENS DU QUÉBEC,
ORDRE DES INFIRMIÈRES DU QUÉBEC, MEDICAL AID IN DYING: 11/2015 PRACTICE
GUIDELINES (Nov. 2015) [hereinafter MEDICAL AID IN DYING].
165. In the Netherlands, assisted suicide and euthanasia can be provided to an incompetent patient who, when competent, made a written request for the procedures. TERMINATION
OF LIFE ON REQUEST AND ASSISTED SUICIDE (REVIEW PROCEDURES) ACT, art. 2, ¶2, reprinted in 9 ETHICAL PERSP. 176, 176–81 (2002). There are no references to patient consent,
capacity or competence in the KNMG/KNMP, supra note 160.
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is administered, 166 the situation is less certain. Lethally injecting a patient incapacitated by unsuccessful physician-assisted suicide or euthanasia might be permitted as part of a single act of “medical assistance in dying.” However, that would not be possible in Oregon,
Washington, Vermont, and California, where assisted suicide is legal
but euthanasia is not.
This suggests that the stability of an “assisted-suicide-only” regime may depend, in part, upon the efficacy of assisted suicide drugs,
the statistical probability of failure increasing with the number of assisted suicides. Media attention on a failed attempted suicide would
likely generate pressure to legalize euthanasia, it being argued that
the acceptance of an obligation to kill is implicit in a physician’s
commitment to assist in suicide.

C. Imposing an Obligation to Kill
Three models of obligation can be used to explain or justify the
imposition of an obligation to kill.
1. The contract model
As the Canadian experience demonstrates, a statute or court ruling that authorizes assisted suicide and/or euthanasia need not impose an obligation to kill on either individual physicians or on the
medical profession as a whole. However, individual physicians may
voluntarily accept such an obligation: implicitly, when they agree to
assist with suicide, or explicitly, when they agree to provide euthanasia. In the case of a failed attempt, the principles of basic contract law
could be invoked to enforce the obligation they have voluntarily accepted: to ensure a respectful death, quick and free of suffering.
The imposition of an obligation to kill based on its voluntary acceptance by a physician does not bind the profession as a whole. Further, a physician’s need for training, drugs, equipment and, perhaps,
the assistance of others, does not require the imposition of an obligation upon others to collaborate in killing. Others can, like a physician, voluntarily accept such responsibilities.

166. Physicians or nurse practitioners must “immediately before providing the medical
assistance in dying, give the person an opportunity to withdraw their request and ensure that
the person gives express consent to receive medical assistance in dying.” CRIM. CODE §
241.2(3)(h), R.S.C. 1985, c C-46 (Can.).
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2. The social contract (professional) model
Social contract theory is often used to explain the concept of
medical professionalism, 167 even by those seeking compromises that
afford maximum protection for freedom of conscience. 168
According to this theory, society gives medical professionals a
monopoly on the provision of certain services (and, perhaps, other
perquisites like wealth or social status), in return for which it expects
physicians, putting the interests of their patients ahead of their own,
to ensure the delivery of those services. 169 This is typically described
as a duty of self-sacrifice. 170 Professional self-sacrifice in the interests
of the patient is extended to include the sacrifice of personal integrity. 171
In 2011, Professor Udo Schuklenk and five other academics argued that physicians unwilling to kill patients or help them commit
suicide should be forced to refer them to colleagues willing to do so,
justifying this with an appeal to patient autonomy. 172 Writing soon
after the Carter decision, expressing dissatisfaction with the notion of
referral, he applied social contract theory:
Doctors are first and foremost providers of health care services. Society has every right to determine what kinds of services they ought
to deliver. 173

167. Medical
professionalism,
CANADIAN
MEDICAL
ASS’SOCIATION,
https://www.cma.ca/En/Pages/medical-professionalism.aspx (last visited Apr. 8, 2016); ABIM
Found., ACP-ASIM Found. & Eur. Fed’n of Internal Med., Medical Professionalism in the
New Millennium: A Physician Charter, 136 ANNALS OF INTERNAL MED. 243, 243–46 (2002);
William M. Sullivan, Medicine under threat: professionalism and professional identity, 162
CMAJ 673, 673–75 (2000); C. OF PHYSICIANS AND SURGEONS OF ONT., THE PRACTICE
GUIDE: MEDICAL PROFESSIONALISM AND COLLEGE POLICIES (2007) [hereinafter CPSOPRACTICE GUIDE], available at http://www.cpso.on.ca/CPSO/media/documents/Policies/Pol
icy-Items/PracticeGuideSept07_nolinks.pdf. [hereinafter CPSO-PRACTICE GUIDE].
168. Conflicts, supra note 146.
169. Id. at 10, 46, 69–70, 79, 86, 132, 214.
170. Julie D. Cantor, Conscientious Objection Gone Awry—Restoring Selfless Professionalism in Medicine, 360 N. ENG. J. MED. 1484, 1484–85 (2009).
171. Udo Schuklenk, Doctors Have no Right to Refuse Medical Assistance in Dying,
Abortion or Contraception., BIOETHICS ISSN 0269-9702 doi:10.1111/bioe.12288 VOL. 31 NO.
3 (2016) [hereinafter Savulescu-Schuklenk].
172. Udo Schuklenk et. al.,. End-of-Life Decision- Making in Canada: The Report by of
the Royal Society of Canada Expert Panel on End-of-Life Decision-Making, BIOETHICS ISSN
0269-9702, VOL. 25, NO. S1, 62, 69, 101 (Nov. 2011) [hereinafter Royal Society].
173. Udo Schuklenk, Conscientious objection in medicine: Private ideological convictions
must not supersede public service obligations, UDO SCHUKLENK’S ETHX BLOG (Mar. 26,
2015), http,://ethxblog.blogspot.ca/2015/03/conscientious-objection-in-medicine.html.

375

MURPHY.MACRO.4.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

BYU Journal of Public Law

5/31/2017 5:39 PM

[Vol. 31

In 2016, Professor Schuklenk joined a geography professor in advancing an obligation to kill based on social contract, assuming a professional obligation to put patient’s interests (not even qualified as
best interests) first. 174 In response to criticism, he and Professor Julian Savulescu defended this position at length. 175
Ottawa law professor Amir Attaran insists that physicians are
“duty-bound” to provide euthanasia or assisted suicide in circumstances defined by the Carter decision. 176 He believes that an obligation to kill should be derived from “ethics and the social contract inherent to Canada’s publicly funded healthcare system,” for which
“secularism is the only feasible social contract”—and, presumably,
the only acceptable source of ethics. 177
More likely the courts would rule that a doctor, having obtained
from society the monopoly power to prescribe barbiturates within
his or her clinical judgment, in turn owes it to society to ensure that
each of his or her patients legitimately needing those drugs gets access—including to die. Or in other words: the doctor’s fiduciary duty matters to the Charter question. 178

While he refers here and elsewhere to fiduciary duties, it appears
that, by “fiduciary duty,” he means no more than what is meant by
Professors Schuklenk and Savulescu: a duty to serve a patient’s interest simpliciter by the delivery of requested legal medical services according to “rules of professional conduct.”179
In any case, Professor Attaran argues that physicians cannot refuse to provide services on grounds prohibited by human rights legislation. Those who are “grievously, irremediably ill” are, he says, “disabled,” and disability is a prohibited ground of discrimination. 180
Professor Attaran claims that, having undertaken to provide medical
treatment to the public, physicians who refuse to kill patients or help
174. Udo Schuklenk, Why medical professionals have no moral claim to conscientious
accommodation in liberal democracies, J. MED. ETHICS (2016), doi
10.1136/medethics-2016-103560.
175. Savulescu-Schuklenk, supra note 171.
176. Amir Attaran, Doctors can’t refuse to help a patient die — no matter what they say,
IPOLITICS (Nov. 13, 2015), http://ipolitics.ca/2015/11/13/doctors-cant-refuse-to-help-a-pa
tient-die-no-matter-what-they-say/ [hereinafter Attaran, IPOLITICS].
177. Amir Attaran, Commentary: The Limits of Conscientious and Religious Objection
to Physician-Assisted Dying after the Supreme Court’s Decision in Carter v. Canada, 36 Health
L. Can. 86, 94–95 (emphasis added) [hereinafter Attaran, Limits] (emphasis added).
178. Id. at 95.
179. Id. at 90.
180. Id. at 94.

objection
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them commit suicide are engaging in invidious discrimination; he
calls them “bigots.” 181
While this attack is directed at dissenting physicians, they are, to
some extent, protected by a constitutional guarantee of fundamental
freedoms: not so physicians willing to provide euthanasia and assisted
suicide. About half of them would provide the services only for the
terminally ill, and very few would provide the services for purely psychological suffering. 182 Leaving Professor Attaran’s broad claims
aside, they may discover that if they provide euthanasia or assisted suicide to anyone, they must provide euthanasia or assisted suicide to
everyone: that if they kill patients who are suffering from terminal
illness, they cannot refuse to kill patients who are suffering from
mental illness. 183
The euthanasia and assisted suicide policy of College of Physicians and Surgeons of Nova Scotia appears to reflect the social contract (professional) model in imposing an obligation on dissenting
physicians to collaborate in killing. They are required to initiate an
“effective transfer of care” to a non-dissenting physician to ensure
“equitable access” to services, patient autonomy and dignity, an “appropriate balance” between physician freedom of conscience and religion and patient’s rights, and legality. 184

3. The fiduciary model
Supporters of euthanasia and assisted suicide often explain the
obligation to kill as a fiduciary duty arising from the physicianpatient relationship. This was explained by counsel for the Canadian
Medical Association during the intervention in Carter at the Supreme
Court of Canada.
“The first principle of medicine” is a physician’s “duty to secure
181. Attaran, IPOLITICS, supra, note 176; Attaran, Limits, supra, note 177.
182. CAN. MED. ASS’N, Annual General Council 2015, Education session 2: Setting the
context for a principles-based approach to assisted dying in Canada, Webcast, 15:23–15:39,
https://webcasts.welcome2theshow.com/cma2015/setting (last visited Dec. 29, 2015).
183. Potter v. Korn, [1995] B.C.C.H.R.D.; Korn v. Potter, [1996] B.C.J. No. 692, 134
D.L.R. (4th) 437 (B.C.S.C.); SCOCAL, North Coast Women’s Care Medical Group v. San
Diego Superior Court, 44 Cal. 4th 1145, 189 P.3d 959, 81 Cal. Rptr. 3d 708, available at
http://scocal.stanford.edu/opinion/north-coast-womens-care-medical-group-v-san-diego-super
ior-court-33046 (last visited Apr. 8, 2017).
184. C. OF PHYSICIANS & AND SURGEONS OF N. S., PROF’ESSIONAL STANDARD
REGARDING MED. ASSISTANCE IN DYING, (June 22, 2016), available at
http://www.cpsns.ns.ca/DesktopModules/Bring2mind/DMX/Download.aspx?PortalId=0&Tab
Id=129&EntryId=284.
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patient well being,” and the traditional view has been that “the cornerstone” of this principle is “[t]he duty to preserve life.”
But the concept of patient well-being is capable of an interpretation
which encompasses the patient’s right to choose death, where the
alternative is certain suffering, a choice which is also supported by
the concept of patient autonomy. Thus, going back to first principles, the two approaches are each possible. 185

In later reversing its policy against euthanasia and assisted suicide, the CMA officially adopted the second approach: that being
killed or helped to commit suicide can be in a patient’s best interest.
This also grounds a duty to cause death in a manner that ensures “a
respectful death, quick and free of suffering.” 186 However, this has
more serious implications.
The principle that it can be in someone’s best interest to be killed
or helped to commit suicide has serious consequences for all physicians because it implies that all physicians, simply by virtue of being
physicians, may have an obligation kill. Moreover, since providing
requested medical treatment is the norm and refusing it the exception
that requires justification, the CMA’s recognition of homicide and
assisted suicide as forms of medical treatment has reversed the customary moral onus for all physicians, not just for dissenters. Assuming the legal criteria are met, killing becomes the norm: it is refusing
to kill patients that now requires justification.
While CMA policy insists that dissenting physicians should not
be forced to participate in or provide assisted suicide or euthanasia, it
adds that “there should be no undue delay” in providing such “end of
life care” to patients. 187 Consistent with this, in defending dissenting
physicians against demands that they provide effective referrals for
euthanasia, CMA officials offered a largely pragmatic argument: that
access to the services would not be a problem, since only “a very
185. Carter v. Canada, Supreme Court of Canada, (Oct. 15, 2015), Webcast of Hearing:
Oral Submission of Harry Underwood (Counsel for the Canadian Medical Association)
227:29/491:20
[228:32/491:20]
(http://www.scc-csc.gc.ca/case-dossier/info/webcast
view-webdiffusionvue-eng.aspx?cas=35591&urlen=http://www4.insinc.com/ibc/mp/md/open_p
rotected/c/486/1938/201410150500wv150en,001&urlfr=http://www4.insinc.com/ibc/mp/md/
open_protected/c/486/1940/201410150500wv150en,001&date=2014-10-15/) (last visited Apr.
8, 2017); Special Joint Comm. on Physician-Assisted Dying, 42nd Parliament, 1st Sess., Meeting
No.
6
(2016)
(statement
of
Dr.
K,
Sonu Gaind), available at
http://www.parl.gc.ca/HousePublications/Publication.aspx?Language=e&Mode=1&Parl=42&S
es=1&DocId=8075735#Int-8772921.
186. MEDICAL AID IN DYING, supra note 164.
187. CMA Policy, supra note 137.
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small percentage” of physicians find referral “categorically, morally
unacceptable,” and about 24,000 physicians were willing to participate. 188 This implies that the exercise of physician freedom of conscience is conditional upon timely patient access to the services.
The College of Physicians and Surgeons of Ontario (CPSO) was
the first state medical regulator in Canada to impose an obligation
upon dissenting physicians to arrange for homicide and suicide. 189
The CPSO justifies this by citing the fiduciary obligations of physicians, claiming that effective referral is necessary “to protect patient’s
best interests and to ensure that existing patients, or those seeking to
become patients, are not abandoned.” 190 It also relies on social contract (professional) arguments. 191
These public affirmations that it can be in someone’s best interest
to be killed or helped to commit suicide, ratified by the Supreme
Court of Canada and affirmed by legislation, have ramifications that
go far beyond the medical profession. Being killed or helped to
commit suicide are now seen to be benefits, at least in the circumstances defined by law. That being the case, a society that extols beneficence can be expected to extend access to those benefits as widely
as possible.
This largely explains why, within a year of the ruling, a provincial-territorial group of experts recommended that legislation should
expand the Carter criteria so that euthanasia and assisted suicide
could be provided to adolescents and children,192 to incompetent
people who had made advanced directives, 193 and as therapy for mental illness. 194 By the time parliamentary hearings were held a few
months later, the recommendations—which had come to be called
Carter-plus—were receiving vociferous support from some groups
and many individuals, and a commitment to consider Carter-plus was

188. Special Joint Comm. on Physician-Assisted Dying, 42nd Parliament, 1st Sess., Meeting No. 6 (2016) (statements of Dr. Jeff Blackmer and Dr. Cindy Forbes), available at
http://www.consciencelaws.org/background/procedures/assist014-001.aspx#Canadian_Medical
_Association. CMA representatives also stated that demanding referral respects the conscience
of some physicians, but not of others.
189. CPSO-MAID, supra note 15.
190. CPSO-POHR, supra note 16; see also ARELC, supra note 5.
191. CPSO-MAID, supra note 15; CPSO-PRACTICE GUIDE, supra note 167.
192. PROVINCIAL-TERRITORIAL EXPERT ADVISORY GRP. ON PHYSICIAN-ASSISTED
DYING, FINAL REP., RECOMMENDATION 17, 29–34 (Nov. 30, 2015) [hereinafter REPORT].
193. Id., Rec. 12 at 29–31.
194. Id., Rec. 18 & 20 at 7, 15, 34, 36–37.
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written into new law. 195

D. The Role of the State in Enforcing an Obligation to Kill
Both euthanasia and assisted suicide necessarily involve acts by
people other than the patient. Among other things, this means that
conflicts concerning the existence and discharge of an obligation to
kill are inevitable, and that they will have to be adjudicated by the
state. Should the state enforce an obligation to kill under any of the
three models of obligation outlined above?

1. Enforcing a contractual obligation to kill
The enforcement of a contractual obligation to kill, voluntarily
accepted, would not seem to have adverse consequences for freedom
of conscience or religion, even if the state is involved in enforcing it,
because enforcement would be directed only against physicians who
had agreed to provide euthanasia or assisted suicide, not on dissenting physicians.
Presumably the role of the medical profession and medical regulators would involve ensuring that physicians who provide euthanasia
and assisted suicide are competent 196 and conform to the requirements of the law, issuing guidelines and directives for this purpose,
and taking disciplinary or remedial action when necessary.
Failing to provide the services as promised could be dealt with by
civil actions for breach of contract, while damages for negligence or
breach of contract might be awarded if a physician failed “to ensure a
respectful death, quick and free of suffering.” 197
However, a difficulty might arise if a physician contracted to provide euthanasia or assisted suicide and later had a moral change of
195. An Act to amend the Criminal Code and to make related amendments to other Acts
(medical
assistance
in
dying),
S.C.
2016
C
14
(Can.),
available
at
http://www.parl.gc.ca/HousePublications/Publication.aspx?Language=E&Mode=1&DocId=83
84014.
196. The methods used for physician-assisted suicide and euthanasia are not difficult to
master. Dr. Ellen Wiebe of Vancouver, discussing her performance of the first judicially authorized euthanasia in Canada, said that she had spent time with experienced providers in the
Netherlands and Oregon, and reading what was available about Quebec protocols. She noted
that some physician training programmes were being planned that would be “useful and helpful” but that no special training was required: “I don’t think that is what we’ll need.” B.C.
Pharmacy Ass’n, Webinar, Physician Assisted Dying: How pharmacists & physicians can work
together, (Mar. 10, 2016, 6:00 PM–7:00 PM Pacific Time).
197. MEDICAL AID IN DYING, supra note 164.
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heart, perhaps as a result of reflection and experience. In many cases
the problem might be resolved by providing timely notice to the patient, but this may not always be possible. Should the state, in such a
case, suppress freedom of conscience or religion and enforce the obligation to kill by requiring performance of the contract?
Holocaust historian Saul Friedlander has something to say about
state involvement in euthanasia and assisted suicide. Friedlander insists that the Nazi killing operation aimed at eliminating “life unworthy of life” had nothing to do with euthanasia, as the term is commonly understood: “the act of painlessly putting to death a person
suffering from a terminal and incurable disease.” 198
While the Carter decision allows more than this, Friedlander’s
definition of euthanasia approximates the thrust of the ruling. Nonetheless, “whatever one’s position on either abortion or assisted suicide,” he says, “comparisons with Nazi killing operations do not illuminate today’s discussion.” 199
It seems to me, however, that one general lesson can be applied.
Government programs launched by the Nazi regime to exclude and
kill clearly show that there are private spheres of human life where
no state interest is sufficiently compelling to justify intervention.
Only the individual directly affected, and possibly his or her closest
relatives, should make such intimate decisions. True, individuals
might err, but even mistakes by millions of private citizens about
their bodies or their lives are far less open to abuse than are judgments legislated by the state and imposed by its agents. 200

Understood in the sense intended by Professor Friedlander, this
observation seems to support what might be called a “pro-choice”
view: that the state should not intervene to prevent assisted suicide or
euthanasia when such procedures are provided as a result of the voluntary choices of individuals. Even if those choices are objectively
problematic, he argues, greater harm is likely to result if the state intervenes to prevent them.
Certainly, those opposed to assisted suicide and euthanasia would
dispute this. Nonetheless, even without engaging claims of freedom
of conscience and religion, Professor Friedlander’s insight provides
an entirely adequate and pragmatic response to claims that the state
198. HENRY FRIEDLANDER, THE ORIGINS OF NAZI GENOCIDE xxi (CHAPEL HILL &
LONDON: UNIV. OF N. C. PRESS 1995).
199. Id.
200. Id. at xxii.
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should intervene, not to prevent, nor merely to authorize, but to
compel some people to kill or collaborate in killing others. Enforcement of contractual arrangements for euthanasia and assisted suicide
should stop short of enforcing an obligation to kill. It is simply too
dangerous.

2. Enforcing a social contract (professional) obligation to kill
Social contract arguments, precisely because they are intended to
achieve the compliance of whole professions or groups of people,
even at the expense of personal integrity, are structurally supportive
of programmes of organized, widespread killing, and subversive of
individual resistance. This is particularly evident when euthanasia activists, by changing the meaning of fundamental terms like “benefit,”
“harm,” and “best interests,” transform codes of ethics into ideological weapons and use them for ethical cleansing by repression and exclusion of dissenters. Quite apart from concerns about freedom of
conscience and religion, Professor Friedlander’s insight has even
greater force when the state is asked to enforce an obligation to kill
based on social contract professionalism.

3. Enforcing a fiduciary obligation to kill
A fiduciary is required to act in the best interests of the beneficiary. However, generally speaking, physicians do not consider procedures to which they object for reasons of conscience to be in the
best interests of their patients. That is certainly the case with euthanasia and assisted suicide.
Nonetheless, the current approach of the medico-legal establishment favours a definition provided solely by the patient, assisted by
the advice and recommendations of the physician. Thus, the CPSO
claims that a dissenting physician has a fiduciary duty to kill a patient
or arrange for the killing if the patient ultimately decides that being
killed is in his best interest. 201
201. CPSO-POHR supra, note 16: “The fiduciary nature of the physician-patient relationship requires that physicians act in their patients’ best interests.” There are repeated references
to fiduciary duty in later sections, including the section on Conscience or Religious Beliefs.
The policy also requires physicians to provide “care” that conflicts with their beliefs in an
emergency, if others cannot do so. Both “emergency” and “care” are undefined. “Care” now
necessarily includes euthanasia and assisted suicide. CPSO-MAID, supra: “The fiduciary nature
of the physician-patient relationship requires that physicians prioritize patient interests. In doing so, physicians must strive to create and foster an environment in which the rights, dignity,
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This, however, violates a fiduciary’s duty not to act under the dictation of another 202—even the dictation of a beneficiary, 203 and renders the concept of fiduciarity superfluous. If what is in a patient’s
“best interest” is defined exclusively by the patient, and the role of
the physician is ultimately to provide whatever the patient has decided to be in his best interest, one does not need a theory of fiduciarity
to describe the physician-patient relationship; one needs only a theory of servitude. The claim that a dissenting physician “abandons” a
patient by refusing to do what he considers to be contrary to the patient’s best interest enforces involuntary servitude, not fiduciary duty.
This remains true even if, in cases where the physician and patient
disagree, some third party is called upon to decide what counts as a
patient’s “best interests.”
To have the state serve as the third party in the case of euthanasia
or assisted suicide would be worse. It would be equally destructive of
the concept of fiduciarity, and it would give the state the power to
determine that it is in one’s best interest to be killed, and to ensure
that it happens. From the perspective suggested by Professor Friedlander, enforcing an obligation to kill based on fiduciary duty would
be far more dangerous than enforcing an obligation to kill based on
social contract professionalism.
Finally, when killing is seen as an act of compassion, refusing to
kill is seen as cruel, 204 even sadistic. Ultimately, killing someone ceases to be the greatest evil; refusing to kill can be worse. Such attitudes,
allowed or encouraged to flourish, provide powerful emotional fuel
and autonomy of all patients are respected.” CPSO-MAID also characterizes refusal to provide
an effective referral for euthanasia as patient abandonment, which is considered a breach of fiduciary duty. The policy directs objecting physicians to adhere to CPSO-POHR, which, as noted above, includes a requirement to provide “care” in emergencies. On the other hand, CPSOMAID states: “The federal legislation does not compel physicians to provide or assist in providing medical assistance in dying. For clarity, the College does not consider providing the patient
with an ‘effective referral’ as ‘assisting’ in providing medical assistance in dying.” This does not
quite amount to a repudiation of an obligation to provide euthanasia in an “emergency.”
202. Law Commission (United Kingdom), Consultation Paper No. 215: Fiduciary Duties
of Investment Intermediaries, (2013), p. 85, http://www.lawcom.gov.uk/wp-content/uploads/
2015/03/cp215_fiduciary_duties.pdf (last visited Mar. 18, 2017).
203. Error! Main Document Only.Law Commission (United Kingdom), Report No.
350, Fiduciary Duties of Investment Intermediaries. Williams Lea Group for HM Stationery
Office (2014) p. 48, para. 3.53, citing Selby v Bowie (1863) 8 LT 372 and Re Brockbank [1948]
Ch 206, http://www.lawcom.gov.uk/wp-content/uploads/2015/03/lc350_fiduciary_duties.pdf,
(last visited Mar. 18, 2017).
204. The alleged “cruelty” of refusing to provide euthanasia or assisted suicide was noted
five times in the trial court judgement and affirmed in the first paragraph of the Supreme Court
of Canada decision. Carter v. Canada, [2012] BCSC 866, ¶¶ 258, 810, 1044, 1047, 1070.
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for self-righteous crusades against dissenters. History demonstrates
that it is in no one’s best interest to place the power of the state at the
service of such zealotry.

E. Summary
All of this suggests that, while the state may attempt to regulate
and even facilitate assisted suicide and euthanasia, the state should
not be permitted to enforce an obligation to kill or to collaborate in
killing, and should not permit any entity or person to enforce such
obligations. This conclusion is entirely consistent with Professor
Friedlander’s observations and with the position of civil liberties advocates, who have traditionally recognized the need to protect citizens against the exercise of oppressive and potentially deadly state
power. Expressed in currently favored legal terms, to allow the state
to enforce or support the enforcement of an obligation to kill would
ultimately be subversive of rights to life, liberty and security of the
person—to say nothing of freedom of conscience and religion.

VI. T OTALITARIAN C LAIMS

A. Recommendations to Force Participation in Homicide and Suicide
Parliamentary committee hearings and debates were held from
January to June 2016 concerning amendments to the Criminal Code
to implement the Carter decision.
In 2016, a joint parliamentary committee recommended that, “at
a minimum,” a policy of effective referral be imposed upon dissenting
physicians. It also recommended that all publicly funded facilities, including denominational institutions, be compelled to provide euthanasia and assisted suicide, not merely to allow the services or arrange
for them to be provided elsewhere. These recommendations could
only be implemented by provincial governments, which have primary
constitutional jurisdiction over human rights and the regulation of
health care professions and hospitals, so the committee urged the
federal government to work with provincial governments to achieve
these goals. 205
205. SPECIAL JOINT COMM. ON PHYSICIAN ASSISTED DYING, MEDICAL ASSISTANCE IN
DYING: A PATIENT-CENTRED APPROACH, RECOMMENDATION 10, 26; RECOMMENDATION
11
27
(Feb.
2016),
available
at
http://consciencelaws.org/archive/documents/
2016-02-25-PDAM-Rpt01-bookmarked.pdf.
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B. Attempts to Secure Legislative Protection for Freedom of
Conscience

Opposition members of parliament and senators proposed or
supported protection of conscience amendments to Bill C-14, introduced by the government to revise the Criminal Code to conform to
the Carter decision. 206 However, the government argued that the
constitutional division of powers between federal and provincial governments would make a protection of conscience clause in the Criminal Code unconstitutional. 207
While this was true, it was also true that the federal government
had exclusive criminal law jurisdiction over the subject matter of Bill
C-14—homicide and suicide. The government could have made it a
crime to force someone to be a party to homicide or suicide. That
would not have prevented the provision of euthanasia or assisted suicide by willing practitioners, nor trespassed in provincial jurisdiction.
However, it would have established that, as a matter of law and national public policy, no one could be compelled to become a party to
homicide or suicide, or punished or disadvantaged for refusing to do
so. The importance of such a provision was clear in view of the recommendations of the joint committee, and the well-known fact that
the College of Physicians and Surgeons of Ontario planned to compel physicians to arrange for homicide and suicide through effective
referral.
At the Justice Committee hearings on the proposed law, the Minister of Justice was asked twice, point blank, if that could be done.
The Deputy Minister of Justice was asked the same question. Both

206. House of Commons Debates, 42nd Parliament, 1st Sess., Meeting No. 55, 1005–
1315 (May 13, 2016), available at http://www.parl.gc.ca/HousePublications/Publication.aspx?
Language=E&Mode=1&Parl=42&Ses=1&DocId=8263399&File=0; House of Commons Debates, 42nd Parliament, 1st Sess., Meeting No. 57, 1535–1750 (May 17, 2016), available at
http://www.parl.gc.ca/HousePublications/Publication.aspx?Language=E&Mode=1&Parl=42&S
es=1&DocId=8284973&File=0; House of Commons Debates, 42nd Parliament, 1st Sess. Meeting No. 57, 1005–1225 (May 20, 2016), available at http://www.parl.gc.ca/HousePublications/
Publication.aspx?Language=E&Mode=1&Parl=42&Ses=1&DocId=8298112&File=0; Vote No
61, 42nd Parliament, 1st Session, Sitting No. 57, 17 May, 2016 (http://www.parl.gc.ca/House
ChamberBusiness/ChamberVoteDetail.aspx?Language=E&Mode=1&Parl=42&Ses=1&Vote=
61&GroupBy=party&FltrParl=42&FltrSes=1) (last visited Apr. 8, 2017).
207. Hon. Jody Wilson-Raybould, Minister of Justice, House of Commons Debates, 42nd
Parliament, 1st Sess., Seating No. 55, 1040–45 (May 13, 2016), available at
http://www.parl.gc.ca/HousePublications/Publication.aspx?Language=E&Mode=1&Parl=42&S
es=1&DocId=8263399&File=0.
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evaded the questions. 208 An amendment of exactly this kind 209 was rejected in the Senate because it would “make an offence out of something that is currently part of the practice of medicine,” it would interfere in provincial jurisdiction, and because federal-provincial
discussions were said to be resolving the issue. 210
In the end, the Liberal majority government allowed only revisions to the preamble, which, in Canadian law, counts for almost
nothing. Only a single substantive section was added to the law:
241.2(9) For greater certainty, nothing in this section compels an
individual to provide or assist in providing medical assistance in dying. 211

C. Canadian Government Deliberately Supports Totalitarian Claims
And that is true. Nothing in the Criminal Code compels individuals or institutions to kill people or help them commit suicide. But
nothing in the Criminal Code prevents such compulsion. Indeed: the
College of Physicians and Surgeons of Ontario subsequently affirmed
that its policy of “effective referral” was consistent with the Criminal
Code. 212
The federal government knew full well that physicians were be208. Standing Comm. on Justice and Human Rights, House of Commons, Parliament of
Canada: Meeting No. 10, Philpott, Jane (Minister of Health), Oral Submission, Edited Video
Transcript: Minister of Justice Jody Wilson-Raybould responding to Iqra Khalid and the Chair,
(May 2, 2016), available at http://www.consciencelaws.org/background/procedures/assist
016-002b.aspx#Philpott; Standing Comm. on Justice and Human Rights, House of Commons,
Parliament of Canada: Meeting No. 10, (May 2, 2016), Department of Health and Department
of Justice, Oral Submission, Edited Video Transcript: Deputy Minister William F. Pentney,
responding to Ted Falk and Mark Warawa, (May 2, 2016), available at
http://www.consciencelaws.org/background/procedures/assist016-002a.aspx#Department.
209. Unfortunately, it used the term medical aid in dying rather than homicide and suicide. “No person shall compel an individual or organization to provide or assist in providing
medical assistance in dying or to provide a referral for medical in dying.” Debates of the Senate,
42nd Parliament 1st Sess., Vol. 150, Issue 46, (June 9, 2016), available at
http://www.parl.gc.ca/Content/Sen/Chamber/421/Debates/046db_2016-06-09-e.htm?#35.
210. Senator Serge Joyal was a member of the joint senate-commons committee that had
made these recommendations. In speaking against the amendment, he cited and briefly paraphrased the policies of Colleges of Physicians and Surgeons across the country, including Ontario’s requirement for “effective referral,” claiming that none of them had been challenged as
being contrary to freedom of conscience. This was obviously an erroneous assertion. Debates of
the Senate, 42nd Parliament 1st Sess., Vol. 150, Issue 46, (June 9, 2016), available at
http://www.parl.gc.ca/Content/Sen/Chamber/421/Debates/046db_2016-06-09-e.htm?
(last
visited Apr. 8, 2017).
211. Criminal Code (R.S.C., 1985, c. C-46), (http://laws-lois.justice.gc.ca/eng/acts/C46/page-54.html#docCont) (last visited Apr. 8, 2017).
212. CPSO-MAID, supra note 15.
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ing ordered to be parties to homicide and suicide, it had the power to
prevent it, and it was repeatedly asked to do so. It steadfastly refused.
This omission was deliberate, and this omission is significant.
It demonstrates that the government of Canada and its supporters
deem it acceptable to force dissenting physicians, “at a minimum,” to
arrange for their patients to be killed or helped to kill themselves. 213
They deem it acceptable to force all publicly funded health care institutions—including denominational institutions—to kill patients in
their care or help them commit suicide. 214 The government of Canada considers all of this acceptable because it could have prevented it,
but deliberately chose to enable it by wilfully refusing to prohibit
compulsory participation in homicide and suicide.
Killing is not surprising. Even murder is not surprising. But to
claim that the state, or a learned or privileged class or profession, can
legitimately compel unwilling souls to collaborate in inflicting death
upon another person, and justly punish them if they refuse—such
claims are extraordinary, and extremely dangerous.
In Hannah Arendt’s terms, these are totalitarian claims. They
seek total domination of will and intellect in moral decision-making,
even in matters of life and death. 215 Such claims would have been
completely unacceptable in Canada only two generations ago.
Why are they now supported by the government of Canada and
prominent members of the academic and medico-legal establishments?
There may be a number of plausible answers to this question, but
one of them is offered in Part 4: morality precedes and drives law.
Arguments now made in support of these totalitarian demands were
first developed in relation to abortion and contraception. Attacks on
physicians refusing to provide or refer for abortion and contraception
were a dress rehearsal for attacks now being made for refusing to
provide or participate in homicide and suicide, because both policies
are supported by the same erroneous and incoherent principle: that
some authority can impose a moral duty to do what one believes to be
wrong, or that the acceptance of such a duty can be made a condition
213. SPECIAL JOINT COMM. ON PHYSICIAN ASSISTED DYING, MEDICAL ASSISTED
DYING: A PATIENT-CENTRED APPROACH, RECOMMENDATION 10, 26 (Feb. 2016) [hereinafter PDAM Report], available at http://www.consciencelaws.org/archive/documents/
2016-02-25-PDAM-Rpt01-bookmarked.pdf.
214. Id. See also, Rec. 11 at 27.
215. HANNAH ARENDT, THE ORIGINS OF TOTALITARIANISM, 310, 311, 323, 326, 336,
339, 371, 392, 404–05, (Orlando: Harcourt, Inc., 1985).
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membership in a profession. 216 It is not an accident that Professor
Jocelyn Downie, one of the foremost advocates of compulsory “effective referral” for abortion and contraception, is also one of the foremost advocates of compulsory referral for euthanasia and assisted suicide. 217

VII. D EFENDING F UNDAMENTAL F REEDOMS

A. A New Establishment Orthodoxy
It is noteworthy that the CMA Board’s approval of euthanasia
and assisted suicide did not generate a backlash from CMA members,
most of whom were opposed to both. In part, this might be explained
by the fact that the change occurred over the Christmas season, and
the announcement in early January made it seem that the Board had
adopted a policy of neutrality consistent with the motion approved by
the General Council. 218
The key factor, however, was that the legal, political and social
landscape changed four weeks later when the Carter decision was released. All attention was immediately directed to its implementation.
Criticism of the policy change would have been considered an irrelevant and unwelcome distraction. As unhappy as they might have been
with the new euthanasia policy, dissenting physicians had nothing to
gain by criticizing the CMA Board of Directors. On the contrary,
they needed the support of the Board and their colleagues.
Most important, the decision placed the Supreme Court’s seal of
approval on the new policy, which was cited in the ruling and consistent with it. Support for euthanasia and assisted suicide in all walks
of life became associated with the authority of the Supreme Court
and the Charter of Rights and Freedoms. Attempts to reverse, revise
or resist laws or policies supportive of the procedures have since been
characterized by Carter enthusiasts not only as reactionary, but as an
216. Sean T. Murphy, No More Christian Doctors: Crusade Against NFP Only PhysiOF CONSCIENCE PROJECT, http://www.consciencelaws.org/background/
procedures/birth002.aspx (last visited Apr. 8, 2017).
217. In 2006, Professor Downie claimed that there was a legal and professional obligation
to refer for abortion. Rodgers S. Downie J. Abortion: Ensuring Access. CMAJ July 4, 2006 vol.
175 no. 1 doi: 10.1503/cmaj.060548] http://www.cmaj.ca/content/175/1/9.full (last visited Apr.
8, 2017). She later made the same claim about euthanasia and assisted suicide. [hereinafter Royal Society].
218. Pat Rich, CMA updates assisted dying policy (Jan. 9, 2016), https://www.cma.ca/
En/Pages/cma-updates-assisted-dying-policy.aspx.

cians, PROTECTION
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assault on constitutional rights, on the authority of the Court and on
the rule of law. 219
Thus, the Carter ruling formally ratified a new establishment orthodoxy, according to which refusing to at least collaborate in killing
in circumstances defined by Carter is unacceptable. The most radical
implications of the new orthodoxy only began to come into focus after the decision, when it finally became possible to dismiss mere collaboration as insufficient, and to demand that physicians must kill patients themselves. Part 4 indicates that this new orthodoxy can be
expected to operate at a foundational level, exerting a significant influence that may not be immediately obvious. On the other hand, it
may also manifest itself publicly as concern about something called
the problem of unregulated conscientious objection.220

1. Dogmatic moral imperialism
What this actually means is that many citizens in responsible positions refuse to do what they believe to be gravely wrong—and that
this is a problem. In 2010, the Council of Europe was urged to address this problem by requiring citizens who intend to make moral
decisions to register with the state, prove to state regulators that they
are sincere, and notify employers and others of their intentions. 221
We do not take this approach to conflicts arising from the exercise of
other fundamental freedoms. We do not typically describe dissemination of pornography or racist ideas as demonstrating “the problem of
unregulated speech.” We do not require citizens to satisfy state
committees of their sincerity before granting them permission to exercise freedom of association. We register sex offenders, not citizens
who plan to exercise freedom of expression.
The so-called “problem of unregulated conscientious objection”
219. B.C. CIVIL LIBERTIES ASS’N, MEDIA RELEASE: BCCLA REACTS TO PASSAGE OF
ASSISTED DYING BILL THAT IT CALLS “UNCONSTITUTIONAL.” (June 17 2016), available at

https://bccla.org/news/2016/06/media-release-bccla-reacts-to-passage-of-assisted-dying-bill-th
at-it-calls-unconstitutional/; Paula Simons, WHEN ASSISTED DYING TAKES A BACK SEAT TO
RELIGION, CALGARY HERALD (Sep. 29, 2016), https://www.pressreader.com/canada
/calgary-herald/20160929/281543700414376.
220. See generally Sean Murphy, The problem of unregulated conscientious objection,
PROTECTION OF CONSCIENCE PROJECT (Aug. 19, 2013), http://www.consciencelaws.org/
background/procedures/execution001.aspx.
221. See Submission to the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe Re: Wom-

en’s access to lawful medical care: the problem of unregulated use of conscientious objection,
PROTECTION OF CONSCIENCE PROJECT (Oct. 6, 2010), http://www.consciencelaws.org
/publications/submissions/submissions-010.aspx.
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is actually the exercise of freedom of conscience and religion seen
through the dogmatic lens of the new orthodoxy. Once upon a time,
dissenters were seen as heretics threatening a divinely appointed social order. Now, dissenting physicians are seen as heretics threatening
an establishment theory of social contract. This is dogmatic moral
imperialism, even if the dogmatists are not ecclesiastical theorists and
functionaries. It should be identified as such.

2. Morality and law
The moral underpinning for European legal systems was provided largely by acculturated Judeo-Christian religious traditions that
persisted in the Europe and the European diaspora until the midtwentieth century, when the validity of such “traditional morality” or
“shared values” was called into question. The questioners, however,
while disputing the nature and content of the morality that ought to
inform the law, did not dispute the need for something of the kind.
H.L.A. Hart, criticizing Lord Devlin’s The Enforcement of Morals, acknowledged that moral consensus, “on certain matters” was essential. 222 Ronald Dworkin did not dispute Lord Devlin’s idea that
“morality counts.” 223 On the contrary, he insisted that judges rulings
are informed by a moral vision of some kind, and developed his own
ideas about what that moral vision should be.224 The growing influence of ethics and bioethics on law and public policy in the late twentieth century, described by Margaret Somerville, 225 appears to reflect
an intuitive insight that Judeo-Christian concepts foundational to law
could not simply be rejected, but had to be replaced with something
else.
The trial court ruling in Carter demonstrates that foundational
moral beliefs shape jurisprudence, yet none of the parties supporting
the law addressed the morality of suicide. 226 This was probably because they reasonably anticipated that moral argumentation would be
ill-received, ineffective and possibly damaging to their interests in a
222. See RICHARD A. WASSERSTROM, MORALITY AND THE LAW 52 (Wadsworth Publishing Co., 1971).
223. Id. at 69.
224. See Noah Feldman, Dworkin’s death deprives Scalia of his moral foil, BLOOMBERG
VIEW (Feb. 14, 2013, 6:39 PM), https://www.bloomberg.com/view/articles/2013-02-14/
dworkin-s-death-deprives-scalia-of-his-moral-foil.
225. Somerville, Bird supra note 1, at 232–35.
226. See Carter v. Canada, [2012] BCSC 886 (Can.).

390

MURPHY.MACRO.4.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

333]

5/31/2017 5:39 PM

Legalization of Assisted Suicide and Euthanasia

judicial environment informed by secularism and moral pluralism.
However, the failure to address the morality of suicide did not produce a morally neutral judicial forum. It simply allowed the belief
that suicide can be moral to set the parameters for argument and adjudication.
When foundational moral beliefs are in issue, Mr. Justice David
M. Brown of the Ontario Superior Court of Justice suggests that
judges should be challenged to candidly acknowledge and precisely
articulate the philosophical or moral premises underpinning their positions. 227

3. The person is central
It is equally important for counsel to put in issue the anthropology that underlies moral reasoning. Reasoning from different beliefs
about what man is and what is good for him leads to different moral
or ethical conclusions. Is lethally injecting a patient harmful, or beneficial? Is it medical treatment, or not?
Such questions cannot be answered without reference to the nature of the human person.
A credal concept of the human person determines not only what
counts as harm, but how one approaches every moral or ethical problem, not only in medicine, 228 but also in law. This, perhaps, is why
basing an obligation to kill upon fiduciary duty is not only destructive
of the concept of fiduciarity, but exponentially more dangerous than
basing it upon principles of contract law.
Change the credal concept of the human person, and the meaning of the law will change, even if the wording of the law remains unchanged. What lies at the root of current controversies about freedom of conscience and religion is fundamental disagreement about
the nature of the human person. Here, too, judges should clearly
acknowledge the credal concept of the human person that informs
227. See David M. Brown, The Courts’’ Spectacles: Some Reflections on the Relationship
between Law and Religion in Charter Analysis: Reasonable Accommodation and Role of the
State: A Democratic Challenge, PROTECTION OF CONSCIENCE PROJECT (Sept. 24, 2008),

http://www.consciencelaws.org/law/commentary/legal046.aspx#001.
228. See Sean Murphy, Freedom of Conscience and the Needs of the Patient, Presentation at the Obstetrics and Gynaeocology Conference in Banff, Alberta (Nov. 9–12, 2001), available at http:\\http://www.consciencelaws.org\Examining-Conscience-Ethical\Ethical23.html;
See Sean Murphy, Service or Servitude: Reflections on Freedom of Conscience for Health Care
Workers,
PROTECTION
OF
CONSCIENCE
PROJECT
(Nov.
4,
2004),
http:\\www.consciencelaws.org\Examining-Conscience-Ethical\Ethical48.html.
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their evaluation of evidence and legal reasoning, particularly when
they intend to suppress other views in favor of their own.

B. Freedom of Conscience
1. Distinctions: perfective and preservative freedom of conscience
A credal concept of the human person is implicit in the observation of Madame Justice Bertha Wilson of the Supreme Court of Canada that, “an emphasis on individual conscience and individual judgment . . . lies at the heart of our democratic political tradition.” 229
Nonetheless, judges and legislators who purport to “balance” conflicting rights claims by limiting freedom of conscience, often fail to
make a critical distinction.
Freedom of conscience is exercised in two different ways. The
first is by pursuing some good that one thinks should be done; call
this perfective freedom of conscience, because the pursuit of the good
as one understands it is thought to be perfective of the human person. The second is refusing to do what one believes to be wrong; call
this preservative freedom of conscience—preservative of personal integrity.

2. Limiting perfective freedom of conscience
By its nature, perfective freedom of conscience demands much
more of society than preservative freedom of conscience, so that limitations are likely to be imposed on it by preventing someone from
doing some good that he believes ought to be done. Such limitations
may interfere with some of the aspirations of citizens or their pursuit
of moral perfection. They are not necessarily inconsistent with democratic freedom or human dignity. Certainly, restrictions may go too
far; they might fail to demonstrate sufficient understanding and respect for human freedom and dignity, even if they do not subvert
them entirely. But no polity could long exist without restrictions of
some sort on human acts, so some limitation of perfective freedom of
conscience is not unexpected.
Limiting perfective freedom of conscience may do people some
wrong; that is why democratic regimes have been increasingly in229. See R. v. Morgentaler [1988] 1 S.C.R 30, 165 (Can.) [hereinafter Morgentaler],
available at http://scc-csc.lexum.com/scc-csc/scc-csc/en/item/288/index.do.
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clined to err on the side of freedom, demanding that restrictions on
freedom of conscience must be demonstrably necessary, narrowly
framed, and strictly construed. But if it does them some wrong, it
does not necessarily do them an injury.

3. Limiting preservative freedom of conscience
Restricting preservative freedom of conscience is very different.
Demanding the submission of physicians’ intellect, will, and conscience in order to force them to serve as means to achieve ends chosen by others reduces them to the status of tools: mere things. Precisely because he believed that segregation relegated persons “to the
status of things,” Dr. Martin Luther King Jr. condemned it as “morally wrong and sinful.” 230 Similar observations have been made by
others. 231
This was lucidly expressed by Madame Justice Wilson. She insisted that an individual must never be treated as a means to an end—
especially an end chosen by someone else, or by the state. She rejected the idea that the state should endorse and enforce “one conscientiously-held view at the expense of another,” for that is “to deny freedom of conscience to some, to treat them as means to an end, to
deprive them . . . . of their ‘essential humanity’.” 232
Thus, to force people to do something they believe to be wrong
is always an assault on their personal dignity and essential humanity
because it reduces them to a form of servitude that cannot be reconciled with principles of equality. It is inconsistent with the best traditions and aspirations of liberal democracy, since it instils attitudes
more suited to totalitarian regimes than to the demands of responsible freedom.
Here it may be significant that the Thirteenth Amendment to the
Constitution of the United States virtually abolished not just slavery,
230. See Martin Luther King, Jr., LETTER FROM BIRMINGHAM JAIL (Apr. 16, 1963),
available at https://www.africa.upenn.edu/Articles_Gen/Letter_Birmingham.html.
231. See Immanuel Kant, Fundamental Principles of the Metaphysic of Morals,

http://www.gutenberg.org/ebooks/5682?msg=welcome_stranger (last visited Oct. 9, 2008),
quoted in Immanuel Kant (1724-1804) Metaphysics, THE INTERNET ENCYCLOPEDIA OF
PHILOSOPHY, http://www.iep.utm.edu/kantmeta/ (last visited Oct 9, 2008); See C.E.M. JOAD,
GUIDE TO THE PHILOSOPHY OF MORALS AND POLITICS 803 (London: Gollancz Ltd., 1938),
quoted in Morgentaler, supra note 229, at 178.; KAROL WOJTYLA, LOVE AND RESPONSIBILITY
27 (San Francisco: Ignatius Press, 1993).; see TZVETAN TODOROV, FACING THE EXTREME:
MORAL LIFE IN THE CONCENTRATION CAMPS 165 (London: Phoenix Books, 2000).
232. See Morgentaler, supra note 229, at 178–79.
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but “involuntary servitude,” a historical practice associated with slavery. 233 Surely, to compel people to serve ends they find morally abhorrent is to treat them as things to be used for ends chosen by others, thus imposing upon them a particularly odious form of
involuntary servitude.
This does not mean that no restriction can ever be placed on preservative freedom of conscience. It does mean, however, that if the
restriction can be justified at all, it will only be as a last resort and only in the most exceptional circumstances. 234

233. U.S. CONST. amend. XIII.
234. Sean Murphy & Stephen J. Genius, Freedom of conscience in health care: distinctions and limits, 10 BIOETHICAL INQUIRY 347 (2013), available at http://link.springer.com
/article/10.1007/s11673-013-9451-x.
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